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Abstract
I show—contrary to common beliefs tolerated by the “bosses”—that any
interpretation of ZF that admits Aristotle’s particularisation is not sound;
that the standard interpretation of PA is not sound; that PA is consistent
but ω-inconsistent; that a sound finitary interpretation of PA is definable
in terms of Turing-computability; and that PA cannot be consistently
extended to ZF.1
1 Preamble: The semantic and logical paradoxes
We are all familiar with the semantic and logical paradoxes2 which involve—
either implicitly or explicitly—quantification over an infinitude.
Where such quantification is not, or cannot be, explicitly defined in formal
logical terms—eg. the classical expression of the Liar paradox as ‘This sentence
is a lie’—the paradoxes per se cannot be considered as posing serious linguis-
tic or philosophical concerns3, except to illustrate the absurd extent to which
0Alix Comsi Internet Services Pvt. Ltd. Postal address: 32 Agarwal House, D
Road, Churchgate, Mumbai - 400 020, Maharashtra, India. Email: re@alixcomsi.com,
anandb@vsnl.com.
1Keywords: Aristotle, Brouwer, Cantor, Carnap, categorical, Church-Turing thesis, Co-
hen, completed infinity, completeness, constructive, computability, effective communication,
ε-function, finitary, first-order, Go¨del, Halting function, Hilbert, interpretation, limit ordinal,
ω, paradoxes, particularisation, Peano Arithmetic, quantification, sound, standard model,
Tarski, Turing, ZF set theory.
2Commonly referred to as the paradoxes of ‘self-reference’, even though not all of them
involve self-reference, e.g., the paradox constructed by Yablo [Ya93].
3It would be a matter of serious concern if the word ‘This’ in the English language sentence
‘This sentence is a lie’ could be validly viewed as implicitly implying that: (i) there is a
constructive infinite enumeration of English language sentences; (ii) to each of which a truth-
value can be constructively assigned by the rules of a two-valued logic; and, (iii) in which ‘This’
refers uniquely to a particular sentence in the enumeration. In [Go31] Go¨del used the above
perspective: (a) to show how the infinitude of formulas in a formally defined Peano Arithmetic
P ([Go31], pp.9-13) could be constructively enumerated and referenced uniquely by natural
numbers ([Go31], p.13-14); (b) to show how PA-provability values could be constructively
assigned to PA-formulas by the rules of a two-valued logic ([Go31], p.13); and, (c) to construct
a PA-formula that interprets as an arithmetical proposition that could be viewed as expressing
the sentence ‘This P-sentence is P-unprovable’ (cf. [Go31], p.37, footnote 67) without inviting
a ‘Liar’ type of contradiction.
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languages of common discourse need to tolerate ambiguity4, both, for ease of ex-
pression, and for practical - even if not theoretically unambiguous and effective
- communication in non-critical cases amongst intelligences capable of a lingua
franca.
Now, addressing such ambiguity in critical cases5 is the very raison d’etre
of mathematical activity which is, first, the construction of richer and richer
mathematical languages that can express those of our abstract concepts that
can be subjectively6 addressed unambiguously; and, thereafter, the study of
the ability of the mathematical languages to precisely express and objectively7
communicate these concepts effectively.
However, even where the quantification can be made explicit—eg. Russell’s
paradox8 or Yablo’s paradox9—the question arises whether such quantification
is constructive or not10.
There are two issues involved here—not necessarily independent.
1.1 Is quantification currently interpreted constructively
over an infinite domain?
The first—and more significant—is whether the currently accepted interpre-
tations of formal quantification11 over an infinite domain can be treated as
constructive or not.
Now, Brouwer12 emphatically—and justifiably so far as number theory was
concerned (see Appendix A)—asserted that Hilbert’s interpretations of formal
quantification were non-constructive. Although Hilbert’s formalisation of the
quantifiers (an integral part of his formalisation of Aristotle’s logic of predicates)
appeared adequate, Brouwer rejected Hilbert’s interpretations of them on the
grounds that the interpretations were open to ambiguity13.
However, Brouwer’s objection was seen—also justifiably, as I show in a subse-
quent section—as unconvincingly rejecting a comfortable interpretation that—
despite its Platonic overtones—appeared intuitively plausible to the larger body
of academics which was increasingly attracted to, and influenced by, the remark-
ably expressive powers provided by Cantor-inspired set theories such as ZF.
4In a lighter vein: Such absurdity is also highlighted by the universal appreciation of
Charles Dickens’ Mr. Bumble’s retort that “The law is an ass” - a quote oft used to refer
to the absurdities that sometimes surface in cases when judicial pronouncements attempt to
resolve an ambiguity by subjective fiat that appeals to the powers - and duties - bestowed
upon them for the practical resolution of precisely such an ambiguity, even when it may be
theoretically irresolvable!
5Such as communication between mechanical artefacts; or a putative communication be-
tween terrestrial and extra-terrestrial intelligences.
6In what follows, I use the words ‘subjective’ and ‘non-constructive’ inter-changeably.
7In what follows, I use the words ‘objective’ and ‘constructive’ inter-changeably.
8Define S by {All x : x ∈ S iff x /∈ x}; then S ∈ S iff S /∈ S.
9Defining Si for all i ≥ 0 as ‘For all j > i, Sj is not true’ seems to lead to a contradiction
(cf. [Ya93]).
10For instance, in Russell’s case it could be argued that the contradiction itself establishes
that S cannot be constructively defined over the range of the quantifier. In Yablo’s case it
could be argued that truth values cannot be constructively assigned to any sentence covered
by the quantification since, in order to decide whether Si is true or not for any given i ≥ 0,
we first need to decide whether Si+1 is true or not.
11Essentially as defined by Hilbert in terms of his ǫ-function [Hi27]
12[Br08].
13They could not, therefore, be accepted as admitting effective communication.
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Since Brouwer far preceded Turing, he was unable to offer his critics an
alternative—and intuitively convincing—constructive definition of quantifica-
tion.
Moreover, since Brouwer’s objections did not gain much currency amongst
mainstream logicians, they were unable to influence Turing, who—as I show in
this paper—could easily have provided the necessary constructive interpreta-
tions sought by Hilbert for number theory, had he not himself been influenced
by Go¨del’s powerful presentation—and Go¨del’s Platonic interpretation—of his
own formal reasoning in Go¨del’s seminal 1931 paper on formally undecidable
arithmetical propositions14.
Thus, in his 1939 paper15 on ordinal-based logics, Turing applied the com-
putational method that he described in his 1936 paper16 in seeking a categorical
interpretation of Cantor’s ordinal arithmetic (as defined in a set theory such as
ZF)—rather than in seeking a categorical interpretation of PA—and apparently
viewed his 1936 paper17 as complementing and extending Go¨del’s and Cantor’s
reasoning.
Turing thus overlooked the fact that—as I show in a subsequent section—
his 1936 paper18 actually conflicts with Go¨del’s and Cantor’s interpretations of
their own, formal, reasoning by admitting an objective definition of satisfaction
that yields a sound, finitary, interpretation IPA(βrouwer/Turing) of PA.
(In other words, whereas Go¨del’s and Cantor’s reasoning implicitly presumes
that satisfaction under the standard interpretation IPA(Standard/Tarski) of PA
can only be defined non-constructively in terms of subjectively verifiable truth,
satisfaction under IPA(βrouwer/Turing) is defined constructively in terms of ob-
jectively verifiable Turing-computability.)
As a result, current theory continued—and continues to this day—to essen-
tially follow Hilbert’s Platonically-influenced definitions and interpretations of
the quantifiers (based on Aristotle’s logic of predicates) when defining them un-
der the standard interpretation19 IPA(Standard/Tarski) of formal number theory.
The latter definitions and interpretations20 are, in turn, founded upon Tarski’s
analysis of the inductive definability of the truth of compound expressions of
a symbolic language under an interpretation in terms of the satisfaction of the
atomic expressions of the language under the interpretation21.
14[Go31].
15[Tu39].
16[Tu36].
17[Tu36].
18[Tu36].
19cf. [Me64], p.107; [Sh67], p.23, p.209; [BBJ03], p.104. For purposes of this paper, I
treat [Me64] as a reliable and representative exposition—where cited—of the standard logical
concepts and theory that are addressed at that point.
20eg. [Me64], pp.49-53.
21[Ta33]. Note that Tarski defines the formal sentence P as True if and only if p—where p is
the proposition expressed by P . In other words, the sentence “Snow is white” is True if, and
only if, it is subjectively true in all cases; and it is subjectively true in a particular case if, and
only if, it expresses the subjectively verifiable fact that snow is white in that particular case.
Thus, for Tarski the commonality of the satisfaction of the atomic formulas of a language
under an interpretation (cf. [Me64], p.51(i)) is axiomatic.
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1.2 When is the concept of a completed infinity consistent
with a formal language?
The second issue is when, and whether, the concept of a completed infinity is
consistent with the interpretation of a formal language.
Clearly, the consistency of the concept would follow immediately in any
sound interpretation22 of the axioms (and rules of inference) of a set theory
such as ZF (whether such an interpretation exists at all is, of course, another
question; one, moreover, that I address in a subsequent section).
In view of the perceived power of ZF23 as an unsurpassed language of rich and
adequate expression of mathematically expressible abstract concepts precisely,
it is not surprising that many of the semantic and logical paradoxes depend on
the implicit assumption that the domain over which the paradox quantifies can
always be treated as a well-defined mathematical object that can be formalised
in ZF, even if this domain is not explicitly defined set-theoretically.
This assumption is rooted in the questionable belief that ZF can express all
mathematical ‘truths’24.
From this it is but a short step to the non-constructive argument—rooted in
Go¨del’s Platonic interpretation of his own formal reasoning in his 1931 paper25—
that PA must have non-standard models.
In a series of recent papers26 I have argued that both of the above foun-
dational issues need to be reviewed carefully, and that we need to recognize
explicitly the limitations on the ability of highly expressive mathematical lan-
guages such as ZF to communicate effectively, and the limitations on the ability
of effectively communicating mathematical languages such as PA to adequately
express abstract concepts—such as those involving Cantor’s first limit ordinal
ω.
Prima facie, the semantic and logical paradoxes seem to arise out of a blur-
ring of this distinction, and an attempt to ask of a language more than it is
designed to deliver.
2 Introduction
I now highlight five ‘beliefs’ in the common foundations of philosophy, logic,
mathematics and computability theory—resting upon Aristotle’s logic of pred-
icates and tolerated (even when not subscribed to) by the “bosses”27—which
illustrate the point sought to be made by Melvyn B. Nathanson in his Opinion
piece, “Desperately Seeking Mathematical Truth”, in the August 2008 Notices
of the American Mathematical Society:
22We define an interpretation IS of a formal system S as sound if, and only if, every
provable formula [F ] of S translates as a true proposition F under the interpretation (cf.
[BBJ03], p.174).
23More accurately, ZFC.
24In a subsequent section, I show how—particularly in the case of Goodstein’s Theorem—
such a belief leads to conclusions that fall short of accepted standards of mathematical rigour.
25[Go31].
26In particular [An08f] and [An08h].
27The word “bosses” is not intended to be pejorative, but to refer to the collective of
reputed—and respected—experts in any field of human endeavour in the sense of Nathanson’s
comments in [Na08].
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“ ... many great and important theorems don’t actually have proofs.
They have sketches of proofs, outlines of arguments, hints and in-
tuitions that were obvious to the author (at least, at the time of
writing) and that, hopefully, are understood and believed by some
part of the mathematical community.
But the community itself is tiny. In most fields of mathematics
there are few experts. Indeed, there are very few active research
mathematicians in the world, and many important problems, so the
ratio of the number of mathematicians to the number of problems is
small. In every field, there are “bosses” who proclaim the correctness
or incorrectness of a new result, and its importance or unimportance.
Sometimes they disagree, like gang leaders fighting over turf. In
any case, there is a web of semi-proved theorems throughout math-
ematics. Our knowledge of the truth of a theorem depends on the
correctness of its proof and on the correctness of all of the theorems
used in its proof. It is a shaky foundation.”
I shall show that standard arguments for the following are founded on plau-
sible, but logically insecure, reasoning (and shall consider some curious conse-
quences):
(a) A sound interpretation of ZF can appeal to Aristotle’s particularisation;
(b) PA is ω-consistent;
(c) The standard interpretation of first-order Peano Arithmetic (PA) is sound;
(d) PA is not categorical; and
(e) PA can be consistently extended to ZF.
I shall show how, and why, such beliefs—instances of the influence of Nathan-
son’s “boss” factor—are suspect for drawing sound conclusions in areas that
cannot be expected to critically scrutinise their foundational framework.
For instance, it is reasonable to assume that these foundational beliefs—
which together imply that effective and unambiguous communication of the
meaning of Arithmetical propositions is not possible28—are implicit (in the
sense that they are neither explicitly accepted nor negated) in the four articles
on Formal Proof in the December 2008 Notices of The American Mathematical
Society29; yet all the authors, curiously, implicitly suggest that effective and un-
ambiguous formalisation of the meaning of Arithmetical propositions, followed
by equally effective and unambiguous interpretation of the formalisation in a
computational model, is possible!
The distinction sought to be emphasised here is between the adequacy30—
and limitations—of a formal language when used for expressing abstract con-
cepts precisely, and the adequacy—and limitations—of the language when used
to communicate such concepts effectively.
In other words, although a formalisation may be subjectively valid if it can,
somehow, be interpreted to mean that which we intended it to express, it is
28A consequence of Kurt Go¨del’s formally unchallenged interpretation of his own formal
reasoning in his seminal 1931 paper [Go31] on formally undecidable arithmetical propositions.
29Volume 55, Issue 11.
30See, for instance, Wang ([Wa63], p.5) for a perspective on ‘adequacy’.
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objectively valid only if it communicates that which we intended it to express
under any interpretation.
More precisely, a formalisation may express abstract ideas adequately if it
is consistent, but it communicates them effectively only if it is categorical.
The thesis underlying the issues addressed in this investigation is that it is
the latter—and not merely the former—which needs to be focused upon as an
achievable goal in a civilisation that is at the stage of actively developing—and
seeking—non-human intelligences.
I shall show how such focus—which should emerge explicitly as the natural
motivating factor at some stage in the development of a formal language—
appears to be lagely absent so far in the mainstream literature on two of the more
basic, formal, first-order languages of mathematics, namely Peano Arithmetic,
PA, and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZF.
I attribute such absence largely to the effect of Nathanson’s “boss” factor
in influencing a selective, and subjective, interpretation of Kurt Go¨del’s formal
reasoning in his seminal 1931 paper “On formally undecidable propositions of
Principia Mathematica and related systems I”31.
In this paper, Go¨del showed the unexpected consequences that follow if we
construct a language whose significant elements can be determined effectively
(i.e., by mechanical methods only and without use of any ingenuity).
Moreover, Go¨del’s insistence on using only constructive arguments in the
formal results of the paper can, today, be viewed as having prepared the ground-
work for Alan Turing’s equally famous 1936 paper on computable functions32;
the latter, essentially, shows how to translate a first-order version of Go¨del’s
formally defined language of Peano Arithmetic into a machine language (i.e.,
into configurations that could be effectively recognised, manipulated and trans-
mitted by—and between—mechanical devices).
My thesis—contrary to accepted wisdom—is that, when interpreted con-
structively, the combination of these two seminal expositions actually yields a
means of effective communication between different forms of intelligence that
are exposed to a common environment.
3 Overview and Definitions
In the first section, ‘Cohen and the Axiom of Choice’, I show that any interpre-
tation of ZF that admits Aristotle’s particularisation is not sound.
In the next section, ‘Go¨del and formally undecidable arithmetical proposi-
tions’, I show that the standard interpretation of PA is not sound, and that PA
is ω-inconsistent.
In the section, ‘Rosser and formally undecidable arithmetical propositions’,
I show that Rosser’s claim in his 1936 paper33—that Go¨del’s reasoning can
be recast to yield a formally undecidable arithmetical proposition without the
assumption of ω-consistency—is unsustainable, since Rosser implicitly assumes
ω-consistency in his argument.
In the fourth section, ‘Turing and a finitary interpretation of PA’, I show
why an uncritical acceptance of Go¨del’s interpretation of his own reasoning in
31[Go31].
32[Tu36].
33[Ro36].
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his 1931 paper[Go31].—as having established that a formal system of Arithmetic
such as PA must have multiple interpretations that are sound, but essentially
different—may have led to an equally critical failure to recognise—particularly
in view of Turing’s 1936 paper34—that PA is categorical (i.e., it essentially
admits only one sound interpretation).
In the final section, ‘Cantor and ZF set theory’, I show that although we
can relativise PA in ZF so that every PA-theorem relativises as a ZF-theorem,
this does not address the issue of whether PA can be consistently extended to
ZF (which would be the case if, and only if, ZF has a sound interpretation that
is a sound interpretation of PA). I show that this is not the case, and that ZF
is inconsistent.
Preliminary Definitions and Comments
Aristotlean particularisation: This holds that an assertion such as, ‘There
exists an x such that F (x) holds’—usually denoted symbolically by ‘(∃x)F (x)’—
can be validly inferred in the classical logic of predicates from the assertion, ‘It
is not the case that, for any given x, F (x) does not hold’—usually denoted
symbolically by ‘¬(∀x)¬F (x)’35.
Formal language: By a “formal language” I mean a “formal system” or a
“formal theory” S which meets the following criteria36:
“(1) A countable set of symbols is given as the symbols of S. A finite sequence
of symbols of S is called an expression of S.
(2) There is a subset of the expressions of S called the set of well-formed formu-
las (abbreviated “wfs”) of S. (There is usually an effective procedure to decide
whether a given expression is a wf.)
(3) A set of wfs is set aside and called the set of axioms of S. (Most often, one
can effectively decide whether a given wf is an axiom, and, in this case, S is
called an axiomatic theory.)
(4) There is a finite set R1, ..., Rn of relations among wfs, called rules of infer-
ence. For each Ri, there is a unique positive integer j such that, for every set of
j wfs and each wf A, one can effectively decide whether the given j wfs are in
the relation Ri to A, and, if so, A is called a direct consequence of the given wfs
by virtue of one of the rules of inference.”
Interpretation: The word “interpretation” may be used both in its familiar,
linguistic, sense, and in a mathematically precise sense; the appropriate meaning
is usually obvious from the context. Mathematically, I follow Tarski’s defini-
tions of “interpretation” with respect to the symbolic expressions of a formal
language37 as excerpted below from Mendelson38:
“An interpretation consists of a non-empty set D, called the domain of the inter-
pretation, and an assignment to each predicate letter Anj of an n-place relation
in D, to each function letter fnj of an n-place operation in D (i.e., a function
from Dn into D), and to each individual constant ai of some fixed element of D.
Given such an interpretation, variables are thought of as ranging over the set D,
and ¬,→, and quantifiers are given their usual meaning. (Remember that an
n-place relation in D can be thought of as a subset of Dn, the set of all n-tuples
of elements of D.)”
Notation: I shall henceforth use square brackets to indicate that the contents
represent a symbol or a formula of a formal theory, generally assumed to be
well-formed unless otherwise indicated by the context.
34[Tu36].
35[HA28], pp.58-59.
36Excerpted from [Me64], p29; however, see also [Sh67], p.2; [EC89], p.154.
37[Ta33].
38[Me64], §2, p49; but see also [Be59], p.179; [Sh67], p.61; [BBJ03]; p.102.
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In other words, expressions inside the square brackets are to be only viewed
syntactically as juxtaposition of symbols that are to be formed and manip-
ulated upon strictly in accordance with specific rules for such formation and
manipulation—in the manner of a mechanical or electronic device—without any
regards to what the symbolism might represent semantically under an interpre-
tation that gives them meaning.
Moreover, even though the formula ‘[R(x)]’ of a formal Arithmetic may inter-
pret as the arithmetical relation expressed by ‘R∗(x)’, the formula ‘[(∃x)R(x)]’
need not interpret as the arithmetical proposition denoted by the abbreviation
‘(∃x)R∗(x).’ The latter denotes the phrase ‘There is some x such that R∗(x)’. I
shall show39 why—as Brouwer had noted40—this concept is not always capable
of an unambiguous meaning that can be represented in a formal language by the
formula ‘[(∃x)R(x)]’.
By ‘expressed’ I mean here that the symbolism is simply a short-hand abbrevi-
ation for referring to abstract concepts that may, or may not, be capable of a
precise ‘meaning’. Amongst these are symbolic abbreviations which are intended
to express the abstract concepts—particularly those of ‘existence’—involved in
propositions that refer to non-terminating processes and infinite aggregates.
Provability: A formula [F ] of a formal system S is provable in S (S-provable)
if, and only if, there is a finite sequence of S-formulas [F1], [F2], ..., [Fn] such that
[Fn] is [F ] and, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, [Fi] is either an axiom of S or a consequence
of the formulas preceding it in the sequence by means of the rules of deduction
of S.
The first-order Peano Arithmetic (PA)
PA1: [(x1 = x2)→ ((x1 = x3)→ (x2 = x3))];
PA2: [(x1 = x2)→ (x′1 = x
′
2)];
PA3: [0 6= x′1];
PA4: [(x′1 = x
′
2)→ (x1 = x2)];
PA5: [(x1 + 0) = x1];
PA6: [(x1 + x′2) = (x1 + x2)
′];
PA7: [(x1 ⋆ 0) = 0];
PA8: [(x1 ⋆ x′2) = ((x1 ⋆ x2) + x1)];
PA9: For any well-formed formula [F (x)] of PA:
[(F (0)→ (∀x)(F (x)→ F (x′)))→ (∀x)F (x)];
Modus Ponens in PA: If [A] and [A→ B] are PA-provable, then so is [B];
Generalisation in PA: If [A] is PA-provable, then so is [(∀x)A].
Standard interpretation: The standard interpretation IPA(Standard/Tarski)
of PA over the structure N is the one in which the logical constants have their
‘usual’ interpretations41 and42:
(a) the set of non-negative integers is the domain;
(b) the integer 0 is the interpretation of the symbol [0];
(c) the successor operation (addition of 1) is the interpretation of the [′] function;
(d) ordinary addition and multiplication are the interpretations of [+] and [∗];
(e) the interpretation of the predicate letter [=] is the identity relation.
The structure N : The structure of the natural numbers—namely, {N (the set
of natural numbers); = (equality); ′ (the successor function); + (the addition
function); ∗ (the product function); 0 (the null element)}.
39See also [An08f].
40[Br08].
41See [Me64], p.49.
42See [Me64], p.107.
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Simple consistency: A formal system S is simply consistent if, and only if,
there is no S-formula [F (x)] for which both [(∀x)F (x)] and [¬(∀x)F (x)] are S-
provable.
ω-consistency: A formal system S is ω-consistent if, and only if, there is no
S-formula [F (x)] for which, first, [¬(∀x)F (x)] is S-provable and, second, [F (a)]
is S-provable for any given S-term [a].
Soundness: A formal system S is sound under an interpretation IS if, and only
if, every theorem [T ] of S translates as ‘[T ] is true under IS ’.
Categoricity: A formal system S is categorical if, and only if, it has a sound
interpretation and any two sound interpretations of S are isomorphic.43
Axiom of Choice (a standard interpretation): Given any set S of mutually
disjoint non-empty sets, there is a set C containing a single member from each
element of S.
4 Cohen and the Axiom of Choice
I begin by questioning the belief that a sound interpretation of ZF can appeal
to Aristotle’s particularisation—a belief that is essential to Paul J. Cohen’s
argument44 that the Axiom of Choice is independent of ZF—and show that it
admits some curious consequences.
4.1 Aristotle’s particularisation: stronger than the Axiom
of Choice
Now, a fundamental tenet of classical logic—unrestrictedly adopted by formal
first-order predicate calculus as axiomatic45—is Aristotlean particularisation.
This holds that an assertion such as, ‘There exists an x such that F (x)
holds’—usually denoted symbolically by ‘(∃x)F (x)’—can be validly inferred in
the classical logic of predicates from the assertion, ‘It is not the case that, for any
given x, F (x) does not hold’—usually denoted symbolically by ‘¬(∀x)¬F (x)’46 .
In his 1908 paper, “The unreliability of the logical principles”47, L. E. J.
Brouwer objected to such inference, on the ground that it is invalid as a general
logical principle in the absence of a means for constructing some putative object
a that satisfies F (a).
However, Brouwer’s objection did not find favour with the “bosses” of the
day. For instance, David Hilbert dismissively noted in an address on the “The
Foundations of Mathematics” delivered in July 1927 at the Hamburg Mathe-
matical Seminar:
“48Brouwer declares [just as Kronecker did in his day] that existence statements,
one and all, are meaningless in themselves unless they also contain the construc-
tion of the object asserted to exist; for him they are worthless scrip, and their
use causes mathematics to degenerate into a game.”
A contributory factor for not addressing Brouwer’s objection with the seri-
ousness that it merited was, perhaps, the fact that Brouwer formulated it as
43Compare [Me64], p.91.
44In his 1963-64 papers, “The Independence of the Continuum Hypothesis”, [Co63] & [Co64].
45See [Hi25], p.382; [HA28], p.48; [Sk28], p.515; [Be59], pp.178 & 218; [Co66], p.4.
46[HA28], pp.58-59.
47[Br08].
48[Hi27], p.474.
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part of an—unnecessarily stringent—‘intuitionist’ program that was unable to
accommodate the emerging ‘formalist’ perspective of the time.
For instance, Brouwer’s rejection of the principle of the excluded middle49
(unwarranted, by the yardstick of Occam’s razor) may have merely served to
obfuscate the issue.
The reason: Although Brouwer’s objection to the validity of Aristotle’s par-
ticularisation as a general logical principle was justified50, it was not for the
various reasons cited by him51.
The invalidity is actually due to an ambiguity arising from lack of a specifi-
cation of the means by which quantified statements—such as ‘For any given x,
F (x) holds’, and ‘It is not the case that, for any given x, F (x) holds’—can be
validly asserted.
Brouwer failed to recognise that, although the principle of the excluded
middle follows from Aristotle’s particularisation, the converse is not true.
4.2 Hilbert’s formalisation of Aristotle’s particularisation
Now, in his 1927 address, Hilbert reviewed in detail his axiomatisation of clas-
sical Aristotlean predicate logic as a formal first-order ε-predicate calculus52, in
which he used a primitive choice-function53 symbol, ‘ε’, for defining the quan-
tifiers ‘∀’ and ‘∃’ (see Appendix A).
In an earlier address “On The Infinite”, delivered in Mu¨nster on 4th June
1925 at a meeting of the Westphalian Mathematical Society, Hilbert had shown
that the formalisation proposed by him would adequately express Aristotle’s
logic of predicates if the ε-function was interpreted to yield Aristotlean partic-
ularisation54.
This, as Hilbert remarked in his 1927 address, was what he had set out to
achieve as part of his ‘proof theory’:
“55. . . The fundamental idea of my proof theory is none other than than to de-
scribe the activity of our understanding, to make a protocol of the rules according
to which our thinking actually proceeds.”
What came to be known later as Hilbert’s Program56—which was built upon
Hilbert’s ‘proof theory’—can be viewed as, essentially, the subsequent attempt
to show that the formalisation was also necessary for communicating Aristotle’s
logic of predicates effectively and unambiguously under any interpretation of
the formalisation.
This goal is implicit in Hilbert’s remarks:
“57Mathematics in a certain sense develops into a tribunal of arbitration, a
supreme court that will decide questions of principle—and on such a concrete
49For various informal and formal formulations of this principle see [Br23], p.335; [Hi25],
p.382; [Hi27], p.466.
50See, for instance, [An08f].
51See, for instance, [Br23], pp.336-337.
52[Hi27], pp.465-466.
53See [Hi25], p.382.
54[Hi25], pp.382-383; [Hi27], p.466(1).
55[Hi27], p.475.
56See, for instance, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Hilbert’s Program.
57[Hi25], p.384.
10
basis that universal agreement must be attainable and all assertions can be
verified.”
“58. . . a theory by its very nature is such that we do not need to fall back upon
intuition or meaning in the midst of some argument.”
4.3 Aristotle’s particularisation and the Axiom of Choice
The difficulty in attaining this goal constructively along the lines desired by
Hilbert—in the sense of the above quotes—lies in the fact that, as Rudolf Carnap
emphasised in a 1962 paper, “On the use of Hilbert’s ε-operator in scientific
theories”, the Axiom of Choice is formally derivable as a theorem in a set theory
ZFε, which is, essentially, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory where the quantifiers are
defined (see Appendix A) in terms of Hilbert’s ε-function59.
Now, as Thoralf Skolem emphasised in “Some remarks on axiomatized set
theory”, delivered in an address before the Fifth Congress of Scandinavian Math-
ematicians in Helsinki, 4-7 August 1922, the Axiom of Choice is an essentially
non-verifiable statement60 which does not express any definable content; there-
fore it cannot be expected to communicate any meaningful information unam-
biguously under interpretation:
“So long as we are on purely axiomatic ground there is, of course, nothing
special to be remarked concerning the principle of choice (though, as a matter
of fact, new sets are not generated univocally by applications of this axiom);
but if many mathematicians—indeed, I believe, most of them—do not want
to accept the principle of choice, it is because they do not have an axiomatic
conception of set theory at all. They think of sets as given by specification of
arbitrary collections; but then they also demand that every set be definable.
We can, after all, ask: What does it mean for a set to exist if it can perhaps
never be defined? It seems clear that this existence can be only a manner of
speaking, which can lead only to purely formal propositions—perhaps made up
of very beautiful words—about objects called sets. But most mathematicians
want mathematics to deal, ultimately, with performable computing operations
and not to consist of formal propositions about objects called this or that.”
Skolem’s remarks seem to be directed against Hilbert’s explicit focus on
viewing the formal consistency of a formal language as adequate for using it as
a language of, both, precise expression and effective communication.
Skolem appears to caution that such an approach encourages viewing math-
ematics as a meaningless “game” (a caution dismissively referred to by Hilbert
in the 1927 address cited above61) by delinking the development of a formal
language, first, from its roots as a formalisation of abstractions that we intend
it to express precisely; and, second, from its goal as a means of communicating
such abstractions effectively and unambiguously.
As Paul Bernays and Abraham A. Fraenkel also caution62, a consequence
of treating the putative entities postulated by the Axiom of Choice as validly
existing in a notional, abstract, space is that:
“63Lebesgue showed by a concrete example that the distinction between con-
struction and existence may, through the Axiom of Choice, affect elementary
(geometrical) problems.”
58[Hi27], p.475.
59[Ca62], pp.157-158; see also Wang’s remarks [Wa63], pp.320-321.
60[Sk22], p.300(8).
61[Hi27], p.474.
62[BF58].
63[BF58], p.17, fn.(1).
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Since Hilbert’s formalisation of Aristotle’s particularisation can be shown to
be stronger than, or equivalent to, the Axiom of Choice of a set theory such as
ZF, Aristotle’s particularisation too must be viewed as essentially non-verifiable,
and nebulous in content, in Skolem’s sense!
Brouwer critiqued Hilbert’s focus more directly in his 1923 address, de-
livered on 21st September 1923, at the annual convention of the Deutsche
Mathematiker-Vereinigung in Marburg an der Lahn:
“64An a priori character was so consistently ascribed to the laws of theoretical
logic that these laws, including the principle of the excluded middle, were applied
without reservation even in the mathematics of infinite systems and we did not
allow ourselves to be disturbed by the consideration that the results obtained
in this way are in general not open, either practically or theoretically, to any
empirical corroboration. On this basis extensive incorrect theories were con-
structed, especially in the last half-century. The contradictions that, as a result,
one repeatedly encountered gave rise to the formalistc critique, a critique which
in essence comes to this : the language accompanying the mathematical mental
activity is subjected to a mathematical examination. To such an examination
the laws of theoretical logic present themselves as operators acting on primitive
formulas or axioms, and one sets himself the goal of transforming these axioms
in such a way that the linguistic effect of the operators mentioned (which are
themselves retained unchanged) can no longer be disturbed by the appearance of
the linguistic figure of a contradiction. We need by no means despair of reaching
this goal,∗ but nothing of mathematical value will thus be gained : an incorrect
theory, even if it cannot be inhibited by any contradiction that would refute it,
is none the less incorrect, just as a criminal policy is none the less criminal even
if it cannot be inhibited by any court that would curb it.
∗For the unjustified application of the principle of excluded middle to properties
of well-constructed mathematical systems can never lead to a contradiction . . . .”
4.3.1 Any interpretation of ZF which appeals to Aristotle’s partic-
ularisation is not sound
The significance of these remarks is seen in the accepted interpretation of Co-
hen’s argument in his 1963-64 papers65.
Cohen’s argument is accepted as definitively establishing that the Axiom of
Choice is essentially independent of a set theory such as ZF.
Now, this argument—in common with the arguments of many important the-
orems in standard texts on the foundations of mathematics and logic—appeals
to Aristotle’s particularisation when interpreting the existential axioms of ZF
(or statements about ZF ordinals) in the application of the seemingly para-
doxical66 (downwards) Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem67 for legitimising putative
models of a language (such as the standard model ‘M’68 of ZF and its forced
derivative ‘N’69, in Cohen’s argument70).
(Downwards) Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem71: If a first-order proposition
is satisfied in any domain at all, then it is already satisfied in a denumerably
infinite domain.
64[Br23], p.336.
65[Co63] & [Co64].
66See Skolem’s remarks [Sk22], p295.
67[Co66], p.19.
68[Co66], p.19 & p.82.
69[Co66], p.121.
70[Co66], p.83 & p.112-118.
71[Lo15], p.245, Theorem 6; [Sk22], p.293.
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Hence Cohen’s argument is also applicable to ZFε. However, since ZFε
proves the Axiom of Choice72, Cohen’s argument73—when carried out in ZFε—
actually shows that:
Theorem 1 : ZFε has no sound model that appeals to Aristotle’s particulari-
sation.
Now, if ZF has a sound model, then this is also a sound model of ZFε. We
thus have that:
Corollary 1 : ZF has no sound model that appeals to Aristotle’s particularisa-
tion.
We cannot, therefore, conclude that the Axiom of Choice is essentially in-
dependent of the axioms of ZF, since none of the models ‘forced’ by Cohen (in
his argument for such independence) are sound.
In fact, treating Cohen’s argument as a valid ‘proof’ of such independence
illustrates the point of Skolem’s cautionary remark regarding the significance,
and purpose, in developing such formal systems for working mathematicians
since, although ZF appeals to Aristotle’s particularisation under interpretation,
it does not—unlike ZFε—adequately formalise our abstract notions of the logic
of predicates as expressed by Aristotle; nor, as Cohen argues, does ZF commu-
nicate a categorical interpretation of the Axiom of Choice.
In other words, ZF is neither an adequate language for the precise expression
of our subjective abstract concepts 74, nor an adequate language for effectively
communicating such concepts objectively.
As Fraenkel and Yehoshua Bar-Hillel remark:
“75There is no reason to suppose that in a set theory constructed on the basis
of an ε-calculus the principle of choice would become generally derivable, unless
the specific axioms of that set theory contain ε-terms themselves.”
4.4 The Continuum Hypothesis
Moreover, believing in the essential independence of the Continuum Hypothesis
may be a curiouser consequence of Nathanson’s “boss” factor.
Definition
The Continuum Hypothesis76: c = ℵ1, where c is the cardinality of the set of
real numbers, and ℵ1—the immediately larger cardinal77 than ℵ0, the cardinality
of the natural numbers—is the cardinality of the constructive ordinals.
The constructive ordinals78: The constructive ordinals are 0o, 1o, 2o, . . . , ω, ω+o
1o, ω +o 2o, . . . , ω.2o, ω.2o +o 1o, . . . , ω2o , . . . , ω3o , . . . , ωω , . . . , ωω
ω
, . . . <o ǫ0.
For instance, if Ordinal Arithmetic79 is consistent, then the members of
the set of real numbers between 0 and 1—when each real number in the set is
72[Ca62], pp.157-158; see also Wang’s remarks [Wa63], pp.320-321.
73[Co63] & [Co64]; [Co66].
74ZFε being a better candidate.
75[FH58], p.184.
76[Co66], p.67.
77For a formal definition of the cardinals see [BF58], p.139; [Me64], p.184; [Co66], p.66.
78See for instance [Be59], pp.374-375; [Hi25], p.374.
79See, for instance, [Me64], p.187.
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expressed in its unique binary form 0.a1a2 . . ., with ai either 0 or 1—are clearly
in some (non-algorithmic) 1-1 correspondence with the members of the proper
subset of the constructive ordinals, {(ω1oa1o +o ω
2oa2o +o . . .+o ω
ω)}.
(Where, as indicated, each ordinal in the subset is expressed in its unique Cantor
normal form; where 0o, 1o, 2o, . . . denote the finite ordinals that correspond 1-1
to the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . .; where +o and <o denote ordinal addition
and ordinal inequality (corresponding to the relation ‘less than’) respectively;
and where aio denotes the finite ordinal that corresponds to the natural number
denoted by ai.)
Further, the ordinals upto ǫ0 are constructive, and there is no cardinal num-
ber between ℵ0 (which is defined as the cardinality of the set of finite ordinals)
and ℵ1 (which is defined as the cardinality of the set of constructive ordinals).
Now, c—the cardinality of the set of real numbers—is the cardinality of the
set of number-theoretic functions of an integral argument whose values are also
finite integers80; and it is also the cardinality of the set of real numbers between
0 and 1.
We thus have the curious conclusion that, in every sound interpretation of
Ordinal Arithmetic, c is equal to the interpretation of ℵ1, since {(ω1oa1o +o
ω2oa2o +o . . .+o ω
ω)} ∈ ωω
ω
and ωω
ω
<o ǫ0!
Now, if Ordinal Arithmetic is consistent then, by Go¨del’s completeness the-
orem, this implies that the Continuum Hypothesis, too, is expressible as a the-
orem in it81!
Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem: In any first-order predicate calculus, the
theorems are precisely the logically valid well-formed formulas (i. e. those that
are true in every model of the calculus).
This, of course, is at variance with the accepted belief that the Continuum
Hypothesis is not provable in Ordinal Arithmetic; a belief that—in no small
measure—can be attributed to Nathanson’s “boss” factor endorsing the point
of view Cohen expressed at the conclusion of his lectures on “Set Theory and
the Continuum Hypothesis”, delivered at Harvard University in the spring term
of 1965.
Thus, whilst, essentially, considering the argument sketched out above, Co-
hen remarked:
“82We close with the observation that the problem of CH is not one which can
be avoided by not going up in type to sets of real numbers. A similar unde-
cidable problem can be stated using only the real numbers. Namely, consider
the statement that every real number is constructible by a countable ordinal.
Instead of speaking of countable ordinals we can speak of suitable subsets of ω.
The construction α→ Fα for α ≤ α0, where α0 is countable, can be completely
described if one merely gives all pairs (α, β) such that Fα ∈ Fβ . This in turn
can be coded as a real number if one enumerates the ordinals. In this way one
only speaks about real numbers and yet has an undecidable statement in ZF.
One cannot push this farther and express any of the set-theoretic questions that
we have treated as statements about integers alone. Indeed one can postulate
as a rather vague article of faith that any statement in arithmetic is decidable
in “normal” set theory, i.e., by some recognizable axiom of infinity. This is of
course the case with the undecidable statements of Go¨del’s theorem which are
immediately decidable in higher systems.”
80See [Hi25], p.384.
81This, essentially, was Hilbert’s argument and thesis in [Hi25], p.384.
82[Co66], p.151.
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Curiously, Cohen appears to assert here that if ZF is consistent, then we can
‘see’ that the Continuum Hypothesis is subjectively true for the integers under
some model of ZF, but—along with the Generalised Continuum Hypothesis—we
cannot objectively ‘assert’ it to be true for the integers since it is not provable
in ZF, and hence not true in all models of ZF.
However, by this argument, Go¨del’s undecidable arithmetical propositions,
too, can be ‘seen’ to be subjectively true for the integers in the standard model
of PA, but cannot be ‘asserted’ to be true for the integers since the statements
are not provable in an ω-consistent PA, and hence they are not true in all models
of an ω-consistent PA!
The latter is, essentially, John Lucas’ well-known Go¨delian argument83, force-
fully argued by Roger Penrose in his popular expositions, ‘Shadows of the Mind’84
and ‘The Emperor’s New Mind’85.
As I have argued in The Reasoner86, the argument is plausible, but unsound.
Moreover, the argument needs to be viewed more appropriately as an instance
of Nathanson’s “boss” factor, since it is based on a misinterpretation—of what
Go¨del actually proved formally in his 1931 paper—for which neither Lucas nor
Penrose ought to be taken to account87 .
The distinction sought to be drawn by Cohen is curious, since we have shown
that his argument—which assumes that sound interpretations of ZF can appeal
to Aristotle’s particularisation—actually establishes that sound interpretations
of ZF cannot appeal to Aristotle’s particularisation; just as I show in the next
section that Go¨del’s argument88 actually establishes that sound interpretations
of PA, too, cannot appeal to Aristotle’s particularisation.
Loosely speaking, the cause of the undecidability of the Continuum Hypoth-
sis, and of the Axiom of Choice, in ZF as shown by Cohen, and that of Go¨del’s
undecidable proposition in Peano Arithmetic, is common; it is interpretation of
the existential quantifier under an interpretation as Aristotlean particularisa-
tion.
In Cohen’s case, such interpretation is made explicitly and unrestrictedly in
the underlying predicate logic89 for ZF; in Go¨del’s case it is made explicitly—but
in a restricted sense to avoid attracting intuitionistic objections—through his
specification of the weaker property of ω-consistency90 (which is a consequence
of Aristotle’s particularisation) for his formal system P of Peano Arithmetic.
5 Go¨del and formally undecidable arithmetical
propositions
In this section I show that a closer scrutiny of Go¨del’s formal reasoning in his
1931 paper[Go31]. actually implies that PA is ω-inconsistent; and that, as a
consequence, the standard interpretation IPA(Standard/Tarski) of PA—which,
too, appeals to Aristotle’s particularisation—is also not sound.
83[Lu61].
84[Pe94].
85[Pe90].
86[An07a]; [An07b]; [An07c].
87[An07b]; [An07c].
88In [Go31], p.24, Theorem VI.
89[Co66], p.4.
90[Go31], pp.23-24.
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5.1 The significance of Hilbert’s formalisation for Tarski’s
standard definitions of the satisfaction, and truth, of
the formulas of a formal language, under an interpre-
tation
Now, the larger significance of Hilbert’s formalisation of Aristotle’s particu-
larisation is that—in formal languages that prefer the more familiar ‘[∀]’ as a
primitive symbol to Hilbert’s more logical choice function ‘[ε]’—it is Hilbert’s
formalisation of Aristotle’s particularisation91 that implicitly gives formal legit-
imacy to Alfred Tarski’s standard definitions of the satisfaction, and truth, of
the formulas of a formal language under an interpretation92, since these defi-
nitions faithfully mirror the particular interpretation of Hilbert’s formalisation
that appeals to Aristotle’s particularisation.
The reason: Under Tarski’s definitions, the formally defined logical constant
‘[∃]’ in an occurence such as ‘[(∃x) . . .]’—which is formally defined in terms of
the primitive (undefined) logical constant ‘[∀]’ as ‘[¬(∀x)¬ . . .]’—always appeals
to an interpretation such as ‘There is some x such that . . . ’ in any formal
first-order mathematical language93.
In other words, Tarski’s definitions ensure that, if the first-order predicate
calculus of a first-order mathematical language admits quantification, then any
putative model of the language must interpret existential quantification as Aris-
totle’s particularisation94.
5.2 Consequences of favouring Tarski’s interpretation: the
standard interpretation of the
Peano Arithmetic PA is not sound
I now consider some consequences of selecting such a strong interpretation—i.e.,
one which favours Aristotle’s particularisation—for the standard interpretation
IPA(Standard/Tarski) of the formal Peano Arithmetic PA over the structure N ,
since IPA(Standard/Tarski) appeals to Tarski’s definitions.
For instance, if we accept the logical validity of such interpretation, then
IPA(Standard/Tarski) is sound (i.e., every PA-theorem interprets as true under
IPA(Standard/Tarski)).
Further, if IPA(Standard/Tarski) is sound, then PA is ω-consistent (i.e., we
cannot have a PA-formula [F (x)] such that [F (n)] is PA-provable for any given
PA-numeral [n], and [¬(∀x)F (x)] is also PA-provable).
5.3 The significance of ω-consistency: Hilbert’s program
The significance of ω-consistency can be traced back to Hilbert’s program. Thus,
as part of his program for giving mathematical reasoning a finitary foundation,
Hilbert95 proposed an ω-rule as a finitary means of extending a Peano Arith-
91[Hi27], pp.465-466.
92[Ta33]; see also [Me64], pp.49-53.
93See, for instance, [Me64], p.52(ii).
94See, for example, Cohen’s standard model ‘M’ ([Co66], p.19 & p.82) of ZF, and its forced
derivative ‘N’ ([Co66], p.121), whose existence is legitimised by appeal to the (downward)
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem ([Lo15], p.245, Theorem 6; [Sk22], p.293) which, in turn, appeals
to Aristotle’s particularisation ([Co66], p.4).
95cf. [Hi30], pp.485-494.
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metic, such as P, to a possible completion (i.e. to logically showing that, given
any arithmetical proposition, either the proposition, or its negation, is formally
provable from the axioms and rules of inference of the extended Arithmetic).
Hilbert’s ω-Rule: If it is proved that the P-formula [F (x)] in-
terprets as a true numerical formula for each given P-numeral [x],
then the P-formula [(∀x)F (x)] may be admitted as an initial formula
(axiom) in P.
Now, if we meta-assume Hilbert’s ω-rule for P, then it follows that, if P is
consistent, then there is no P-formula [F (x)] for which, first, [¬(∀x)F (x)] is
P-provable and, second, [F (n)] is P-provable for any given P-numeral [n]. In
other words, if we meta-assume Hilbert’s ω-rule for P, then a consistent P is
necessarily ω-consistent.
5.4 Aristotle’s particularisation implies that PA has non-
standard models
Now, in his seminal 1931 paper96, Go¨del showed that if a Peano Arithmetic such
as his formal system P is ω-consistent, then it is incomplete97 (in the sense that
he could constructively define a P-formula [R(x)] such that neither [(∀x)R(x)]
nor [¬(∀x)R(x)] are P-provable98).
Go¨del concluded that an ω-consistent P must, therefore, have a consistent,
but ω-inconsistent, extension P′, obtained by adding [¬(∀x)R(x)] as an axiom
to P99.
Since Go¨del’s argument holds for PA, we thus have that:
(a) If Hilbert’s formalisation of Aristotlean predicate logic has a
sound interpretation when the ε-function is interpreted to appeal
to Aristotlean particularisation, then the standard interpretation
IPA(Standard/Tarski) of PA is sound;
(b) If IPA(Standard/Tarski) is sound then PA is ω-consistent;
(c) If PA is ω-consistent then it has a non-standard model containing
non-natural numbers that satisfy PA (under Tarski’s definitions of
the satisfiability and truth of the propositions of a formal language
under an interpretation), but which are not definable in it!
5.5 A consistent PA is not ω-consistent
However, Go¨del also showed that if P is consistent and [(∀x)R(x)] is assumed
P-provable, then [¬(∀x)R(x)] is P-provable100. By Go¨del’s definition of P-
provability, it follows that there is a finite sequence [F1], . . . , [Fn] of P-formulas
such that [F1] is [(∀x)R(x)], [Fn] is [¬(∀x)R(x)], and, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, [Fi] is either
a P-axiom or a logical consequence of the preceding formulas in the sequence
by the rules of inference of P.
96[Go31].
97[Go31], Theorem VI, p.24.
98[Go31], p.25(1) & p.26(2).
99[Go31], p.27.
100This follows from Go¨del’s argument in [Go31], p.26(1).
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Now, a proof sequence of P necessarily interprets as a sound deduction se-
quence under any sound interpretation of P. It follows that we cannot have
a sound interpretation of P under which [(∀x)R(x)] interprets as true and
[¬(∀x)R(x)] as false.
Since both [(∀x)R(x)] and [(∀x)R(x)] are closed P-formulas, it follows that
the P-formula [(∀x)R(x) → ¬(∀x)R(x)] interprets as true under every sound
interpretation of P. By Go¨del’s completeness theorem [(∀x)R(x)→ ¬(∀x)R(x)]
is, therefore, P-provable; whence [¬(∀x)R(x)] is P-provable.
Since Go¨del also showed that, if P is consistent, then [R(n)] is P-provable for
any given P-numeral [n]101, it follows that P is not ω-consistent (The detailed
argument is given in Appendix B).
Since Go¨del’s argument holds in PA, we further have that:
Theorem 2 : A consistent PA is not ω-consistent.
Thus Go¨del’s Theorem VI of his 1931 paper102 is vacuously true, and does
not establish the existence of a formally undecidable proposition in P.
(The above argument also applies to J. Barkley Rosser’s extension of Go¨del’s
reasoning103, since—as I show in the next section—Rosser’s argument implic-
itly appeals to Aristotle’s particularisation; thus, despite his claim of having
assumed only simple consistency for P, Rosser’s argument also presumes—albeit
implicitly—that P is ω-consistent.)
5.5.1 The standard interpretation IPA(Standard/Tarski) of PA is not
sound
It also follows that a sound interpretation of PA, too, cannot appeal to Aristo-
tle’s particularisation, and so:
Theorem 3 : The interpretation IPA(Standard/Tarski) of PA is not sound.
In other words—as Brouwer had noted104—the phrase, ‘There is some x
such that R∗(x)’, is not always capable of an unambiguous meaning that can
be represented in a formal language by the formula ‘[(∃x)R(x)]’.
5.5.2 PA is categorical
Nevertheless, as I show in a subsequent section, Turing’s seminal 1936 paper on
computable numbers105 actually admits a sound, finitary, interpretation of an
ω-inconsistent PA that is categorical.
5.6 Go¨del’s interpretation of his own formal reasoning:
Another case of Nathanson’s “boss” factor
Meanwhile, I briefly review some factors that appear to have influenced the
acceptance of the standard model IPA(Standard/Tarski) of PA as sound.
101[Go31], p.26(2).
102[Go31], pp.24-26.
103[Ro36].
104[Br08].
105[Tu36].
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Now, historically it was in the course of an investigation106 intended to
capture the essential concepts of Arithmetic—sought to be expressed by the
Peano Postulates—in a formal language P that Go¨del discovered107 he could
construct a proposition [(∀x)R(x)] in P such that, if P is assumed ω-consistent,
then neither [(∀x)R(x)] nor [¬(∀x)R(x)] could be proven from the axioms of P
by the rules of inference of P108!
Moreover, Go¨del constructed his ‘undecidable’ P-proposition [(∀x)R(x)] in
such a way that its ‘standard’ interpretation was an assertion about the natural
numbers that was undeniably true (since it could constructively be shown to be
a logical consequence of the Peano Postulates).
“109One can easily convince oneself that the proof we have just given is con-
structive . . . For, all the existential assertions occuring in the proof rest upon
Theorem V, which, as is easy to see, is intuitionistically unobjectionable”.
5.7 Go¨del’s interpretation of his own formal reasoning im-
plies that perfect communication is not theoretically
possible
Go¨del showed, further, that this state of affairs would persist for any ω-consistent
language that seeks to formally express all our true propositions about the nat-
ural numbers that are sought to be captured by the Peano Postulates using
classical first-order logic.
Now, as noted earlier, Go¨del interpreted his reasoning as showing not only
that there is more than one way of interpreting any ω-consistent language which
seeks to formally express all our true propositions about the natural numbers,
but that, in some of these ‘non-standard’ interpretations, our formally undecid-
able but intuitively ‘true’ (i.e., true under the standard interpretation of PA)
proposition would be seen as false!
“110If one adjoins Neg(17Gen r) to κ, then one obtains a consistent, but not an
ω-consistent, class of FORMULAS κ′.”
So, even though Go¨del’s P-unprovable formula [(∀x)R(x)] would interpret
as true under the ‘standard’ interpretation of a consistent P, we could add the
P-unprovable formula [¬(∀x)R(x)] to P and obtain a consistent language P′
such that, under a sound interpretation of P′ (which Go¨del implicitly implies as
existing), the P-formula [(∀x)R(x)] would interpret as ‘false’ !
In other words—according to Go¨del’s interpretation of his own formal rea-
soning in his 1931 paper111—even if we are able to represent all our true propo-
sitions about the natural numbers in a formal Arithmetic A, there will always be
some of our true propositions that will not be known to be true to someone who
has access only to the formal expressions of these propositions in A, and who
tries to ‘decode’ their meaning in order to determine whether the propositions
can be held to be objectively true or not.
106Apparently motivated by Hilbert’s Program.
107[Go31], pp.5-6.
108See [Go31], p.24, Theorem VI.
109[Go31], p.26.
110[Go31], p.27.
111[Go31].
19
This implies that perfect communication is not theoretically possible in such
languages.
Now, first-order Peano Arithmetic PA (which is accepted as the most con-
structive and faithful formalisation of the Peano Postulates) is the foundation
for the most fundamental and unequivocal of our machine languages—namely
those that enable mechanical and electronic artefacts to ‘talk’ to each other
without any perceivable ambiguity.
Thus, acceptance of Go¨del’s interpretation of his own reasoning as definitive
by the “bosses” of the day entails acceptance of the conclusion that there are
theoretical limits on unambiguous and effective communication.
However, this acceptance is based on a selective interpretation of Go¨del’s
remarks at the conclusion of his Theorem VI112; remarks which appear curiously
ambiguous both on the significance of the assumption of ω-consistency for his
system P of Arithmetic, and on the formal systems in which his arguments are
valid.
“113In the proof of Theorem VI no properties of the system P were used other
than the following:
1. The class of axioms and the rules of inference (i.e. the relation “immedi-
ate consequence”’) are recursively definable (when the primitive symbols are
replaced in some manner by natural numbers).
2. Every recursive relation is definable within the system P (in the sense of
Theorem V).
Hence, in every formal system which satisfies assumptions 1, 2 and is ω-consistent,
there exist undecidable propositions of the form (x)F (x), where F is a recur-
sively defined property of the natural numbers, and likewise in every extension
of such a system by a recursively definable ω-consistent class of axioms. To the
systems which satisfy assumptions 1, 2 belong, as one can easily confirm, the
Zermelo-Fraenkel and the v. Neumann axiom systems for set theory, and, in
addition, the axiom system for number theory which consists of Peano’s axioms,
recursive definitions (according to schema (2)) and the logical rules. . . . ”
“114The true reason for the incompleteness which attaches to all formal systems
of mathematics lies, as will be shown in Part II of this paper, in the fact that
the formation of higher and higher types can be continued into the transfinite
(c.f., D. Hilbert, ‘U¨ber das Unendliche’, Math. Ann. 95, p. 184), while, in
every formal system, only countable many are available. Namely, one can show
that the undecidable sentences which have been constructed here always become
decidable through adjunction of suitable high types (e.g. of the type ω to the
system P . A similar result also holds for the axiom systems of set theory.”
Thus, Go¨del’s remarks implicitly suggest that all the formal systems of Peano
Arithmetic cited by him can be assumed ω-consistent.115
However, as I have shown above, first-order Peano Arthmetic PA is actually
ω-inconsistent!
112[Go31], p.28.
113[Go31], p.28.
114[Go31], p.28, footnote 48a.
115[Go31], p.28. That this belief is both current and widespread
is evidenced in the following entry (as of 27th July 2008) under the
Self-Reference section of the on-line Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (§2.4), where
it is remarked that: “Go¨del’s theorem can be interpreted as demonstrating a limitation in
what can be achieved by purely formal procedures. It says that if first-order arithmetic is
ω-consistent (which it is believed to be), then there must be arithmetical sentences that can
neither be proved nor disproved by the formal procedures of first-order arithmetic”.
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Moreover, once we admit such interpretations, we must be prepared to face
the disquieting—though, prima facie, spiritually implausible—spectre of the
possibility of idealogical conflicts with differing intelligences—and not merely
differing faiths—over why (as at present), or even whether, a particular inter-
pretation can lay claim to being the preferred ‘standard’ interpretation of a
formal system such as PA!
6 Rosser and formally undecidable arithmetical
propositions
Of course, since every ω-consistent system is necessarily simply consistent,
Go¨del’s reasoning per se is significant only if there is an ω-consistent language
that seeks to formally express all our true propositions about the natural num-
bers.
Now, the issue of whether there is an ω-consistent system of Arithmetic at
all appears to have been treated as inconsequential116 following Rosser’s 1936
paper117, in which he claimed that Go¨del’s reasoning can be recast to arrive at
his intended result without the assumption of ω-consistency.
Although both Go¨del’s proof and Rosser’s argument are complex, and not
easy to unravel, the former has been extensively analysed and its various steps
formally validated118 in a number of expositions of Go¨del’s number-theoretic
reasoning119.
6.1 Rosser’s argument: A further case of Nathanson’s
“boss” factor
In sharp contrast, Rosser’s widely cited120 argument does not appear to have re-
ceived the same critical scrutiny, and—lending force to Nathanson’s observation—
its number-theoretic expositions generally remain either implicit or sketchy121.
6.1.1 The significance of Rosser’s claim
The significance of Rosser’s argument is that its acceptance as a ‘proof’ lends
legitimacy to arguments which implicitly assume that the existence of unde-
cidable propositions in PA must follow—without addressing the significance or
116See, for instance, [Be59], p.595; [Wa63], p.19 (Theorem 3) & p.25; [Me64], p.144; [Sh67],
p.132 (Incompleteness Theorem); [EC89], p.215; [BBJ03], p.224 (Go¨del’s first incompleteness
theorem).
117[Ro36].
118Possibly because Go¨del’s remarkably self-contained 1931 paper—it neither contained, nor
needed, any formal citations—remains unsurpassed in mathematical literature for thorough-
ness, clarity, transparency and soundness of exposition.
119For instance [Me64], p.143; [EC89], p.210-211.
120[Be59], pp.393-395 (which focuses on Rosser’s argument, and treats Go¨del’s proof of his
Theorem VI ([Go31], p.24) as a, secondary, weaker result); [Wa63], p.337; [Me64], pp.144-147;
[Sh67], p.232 (interestingly, this introductory text contains no reference to Go¨del or to his
1931 paper!); [EC89], p.215; [Sm92], p.81; [BBJ03], p.226 (this introductory text, too, focuses
on Rosser’s argument, and treats Go¨del’s argument as more of a historical curiosity!).
121See [Be59], p.593-595; [Wa63], p.337; [Sh67], p.232; [Rg87], p.98; [EC89], p.217, Ex.2;
[Sm92], p.81; [BBJ03], p.226.
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consequences of ω-consistency—from the establishment of undecidable proposi-
tions in first-order systems other than PA that are capable of formalising the
Peano Postulates.122
If Rosser’s argument had not been accepted so readily—and so uncritically—
as capable of conversion to a formal proof by the “bosses” of the day123, surely
more attention would have been given to the significance of Go¨del’s explicit
assumption of ω-consistency for his system of Peano Arithmetic; to its relation
to Hilbert’s ω-rule; to its deeper relation to the Hilbert-Brouwer dispute over
the interpretation of the existential quantifier of a formal language that appeals
to Aristotle’s particularisation; and to the possibility of its falsity.
However, acceptance of Rosser’s argument as valid blurred the critical dis-
tinction between Go¨del’s original, constructive124, number-theoretic, argument—
which appeals only to the consistency of first-order formalisations of Peano
Arithmetic such as PA—and arguments that:
(i) seek to validate Go¨del’s Theorem VI of his 1931 paper (such as Rosser’s
claimed extension of it) by reasoning that appeals to arguments125 which pre-
sume upon the soundness of the ‘standard’ interpretation IPA(Standard/Tarski)
of PA in an attempt to conclude these results as corollaries of arguments that
by-pass the constructive number-theoretic constraints within which Go¨del’s ar-
guments were originally derived;
(ii) seek to validate Go¨del’s Theorem VI of his 1931 paper (and Rosser’s
claimed extension of it) by reasoning that appeals to the consistency of formal-
isations of Cantor’s set theory—such as ZF—in an attempt to conclude these
results as corollaries of more general, non-constructive, set-theoretical argu-
ments that by-pass the constructive number-theoretic constraints within which
Go¨del’s arguments were originally derived126.
Striking examples of (i) are Hao Wang’s and E. W. Beth’s independent,
sketchy, formalisations of Rosser’s informal argument.
6.1.2 Wang’s outline of Rosser’s argument
Wang, for instance, states that127 from the formal provability of:
(i) ¬(x)(B(x, q) ⊃ (Ey)(y ≤ x&B(y, n(q))))
in his formal system of first-order Peano Arithmetic Z, we may infer the formal
provability of:
(ii) (Ex)(B(x, q) & ¬(Ey)(y ≤ x&B(y, n(q))))
However, the inference (ii) from (i) only follows if we assume that the fol-
lowing deduction is valid for some j:
¬(x)(B(x, q) ⊃ (Ey)(y ≤ x&B(y, n(q))))
B(j, q) & ¬(Ey)(y ≤ j &B(y, n(q)))
(Ex)(B(x, q) & ¬(Ey)(y ≤ x&B(y, n(q))))
122For instance [Sh67] on p.232, and [BBJ03] on pp.224 and 226.
123Including Go¨del!
124See [Go31], p.26.
125Such as [Be59], p.594; [Wa63], p.337; [EC89], p.206 & p.215; [Sm92], p.36; [BBJ03], p.224.
126For instance [Sh67], p.232; [EC89], p.215.
127[Wa63], p.337.
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Now, this deduction assumes that the ‘standard’ interpretation of PA, when
applied to Wang’s Peano Arithmetic Z, is sound—which is not the case!
Although Wang does not explicitly define the interpretation of the formal Z-
formula ‘(Ex)F (x)’ as ‘There is some x such that F (x)’, this interpretation ap-
pears implicit in his discussion and definition of ‘(Ev)A(v)’ in terms of Hilbert’s
ε-function128 as a property of the underlying logic of Wang’s Peano Arithmetic
Z, and is obvious in the above argument.
In other words Wang implicitly implies that the interpretation of existential
quantification cannot be specific to any particular interpretation of a formal
mathematical language, but must necessarily be determined by the predicate
calculus that is to be applied uniformly to all the mathematical languages in
question.
6.1.3 Beth’s outline of Rosser’s argument
Similarly, in his outline of a formalisation of Rosser’s argument, Beth implicitly
concludes129 that from the formal provability of:
(i) ¬(q)[G1(m0, q,m0)→ (s){B(s, q)→ (Et)[t ≤ s& (Er){H(q, r) &B(t, r)}]}]
in his formal system of first-order Peano Arithmetic P, we may infer the formal
provability of:
(ii) (Eq)[G1(m
0, q,m0) & (s){B(s, q) & (t)[t ≤ s→ (r){H(q, r)→ B(t, r)}]}]
However, the inference (ii) from (i) only follows if we assume that the fol-
lowing deduction is valid for some j:
¬(q)[G1(m0, q,m0)→ (s){B(s, q)→ (Et)[t ≤ s& (Er){H(q, r) &B(t, r)}]}]
G1(m
0, j,m0) & (s){B(s, j) & (t)[t ≤ s→ (r){H(j, r)→ B(t, r)}]}
(Eq)[G1(m
0, q,m0) & (s){B(s, q) & (t)[t ≤ s→ (r){H(q, r)→ B(t, r)}]}]
This deduction, again, assumes that the ‘standard’ interpretation of PA,
when applied to Beth’s Peano Arithmetic P, is sound—which is not the case!
In this case, Beth explicitly defines the interpretation of the formal P-formula
‘(Ex)’ as ‘There is a value of x such that’130 .
Thus Beth, too, implies that the interpretation of existential quantification in
formalised axiomatics cannot be specific to any particular interpretation of a
formal mathematical language, but must necessarily be determined by the pred-
icate calculus that is to be applied uniformly to all the mathematical languages
in question.
6.2 Rosser’s argument does not support his claim
Now, Rosser’s claim in his ‘extension’131 of Go¨del’s argument132 is that, whereas
Go¨del’s argument assumes that his Peano Arithmetic, P, is ω-consistent, Rosser’s
assumes only simple consistency.
128[Wa63], p.315(2.31); see also p.10 & pp.443-445.
129[Be59], p.594 (ij).
130[Be59], p.178.
131[Ro36].
132[Go31].
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P is defined as ω-consistent if, and only if, there is no P-formula [R(x)]
for which [¬(∀x)R(x)] is P-provable whilst [R(n)] is P-provable for any given
numeral [n] of P.
However, Rosser’s original argument (sketch) also appears to presume—
albeit implicitly—that the system of Peano Arithmetic in question is ω-consistent.
For instance, the concluding deduction in Rosser’s reasoning implicitly pre-
sumes that if, for any given natural number n, the formula in Go¨del’s Peano
Arithmetic P whose Go¨del-number is:
Neg(Sb(r
u
Z(n)
v
Z(a)
))
is Pκ-provable
133 under the given premises, we may conclude that, if P is simply
consistent, then the P-formula whose Go¨del-number is:
uGen(Neg(Sb(r
v
Z(a)
)))
is also Pκ-provable.
Rosser essentially seems to reason here that since the P-formula [¬R(n, a)]—
where [a] is a specific P-numeral—is Pκ-provable for any given P-numeral [n],
we may conclude that the P-formula [(∀u)¬R(u, a)] is Pκ-provable. This would
presume, however, that P is ω-consistent.
6.3 Where Rosser’s argument presumes ω-consistency
I consider a more formal expression134 of Rosser’s argument in Appendix C, and
highlight where it implicitly presumes that P is ω-consistent.
7 Turing and a finitary interpretation of PA
In this section I show why an uncritical acceptance of Go¨del’s interpretation of
his own reasoning in135—as having established that a formal system of Arith-
metic such as PA must have multiple interpretations that are sound, but essen-
tially different—may have led to a critical failure to recognise (particularly in
view of Turing’s 1936 paper136) that PA is categorical (i.e., that PA essentially
admits only one sound interpretation).
The significance of such recognition is that it would explain why we unhesi-
tatingly entrust our lives each moment of each day to mechanical and electronic
artefacts whose reliability is essentialy founded on the ability of PA to admit
unambiguous and effective communication. It would also imply that we can, in
principle, communicate perfectly with technologically advanced extra-terrestrial
intelligences.
7.1 Turing-computability: A finitary interpretation of PA
I consider a weakened, finitary, interpretation IPA(βrouwer/Turing) of an ω-
inconsistent PA which avoids appealing to Aristotlean particularisation in the
133Notation (due to Go¨del): By ‘Pκ-provable’ we mean provable from the axioms of PA and
an arbitrary class of PA-formulas κ—including the case where κ is empty—by the rules of
deduction of PA.
134eg. [Me64], p.145, Proposition 3.32.
135[Go31].
136[Tu36].
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interpretation of the existential quantifier, and which is actually implicit in
Turing’s 1936 analysis of computable functions137.
Specifically, I consider an interpretation IPA(βrouwer/Turing) of PA in which
we interpret the non-logical constants as in the standard interpretation IPA(Stan−
dard/Tarski) of PA in the ‘usual’ manner, but interpret the logical constants al-
gorithmically in an ‘unusual’, yet consistent, manner.
This is the interpretation IPA(βrouwer/Turing) of PA obtained if, in Tarski’s
inductive definitions (1)-(8) below138—of the satisfaction and truth of the for-
mulas of PA under the standard interpretation IPA(Standard/Tarski) of PA—we
apply Occam’s razor and weaken (1) by replacing it with the algorithmic def-
inition of Turing-satisfiability (1b) (where (1a) is to be viewed simply as an
intermediate definition of a catalytic nature).
7.2 Defining satisfiability algorithmically
Thus, we consider the definitions:
(1) Tarskian satisfiability: If [A(t1, . . . , tn)] is an atomic well-formed formula
of PA, A∗(t∗1, . . . , t
∗
n) the corresponding interpretation under IPA(Standard/Tarski),
and the sequence of PA-terms [a1], . . . , [an] interprets under IPA(Standard/Tarski)
as a∗1 . . . , a
∗
n, then a
∗
1 . . . , a
∗
n satisfies [A(t1, . . . , tn)] under IPA(Standard/Tarski)
if, and only if, A∗(a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n) holds in the domain of the natural numbers;
(1a) Markovian satisfiability: If [A(t1, . . . , tn)] is an atomic well-formed for-
mula of PA, A∗(t∗1, . . . , t
∗
n) the corresponding interpretation under IPA(Standard−
/Tarski), and the sequence of PA-terms [a1], . . . , [an] interprets under IPA(Standa−
rd/Tarski) as a
∗
1 . . . , a
∗
n, then a
∗
1 . . . , a
∗
n satisfies [A(t1, . . . , tn)] under IPA(Markov)
if, and only if, there is a Markov algorithm139 to establish that A∗(a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n)
holds in the domain of the natural numbers;
(1b)Brouwer-Turing satisfiability: If [A(t1, . . . , tn)] is an atomic well-formed
formula of PA,A∗(t∗1, . . . , t
∗
n) the corresponding interpretation under IPA(Standa−
rd/Tarski), and the sequence of PA-terms [a1], . . . , [an] interprets under IPA(Stan−
dard/Tarski) as a
∗
1 . . . , a
∗
n, then a
∗
1 . . . , a
∗
n satisfies [A(t1, . . . , tn)] under IPA(βrouwer
/Turing) if, and only if, A
∗(a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n) is TMA∗ -computable as true (when
treated as a Boolean expression) in the domain of the natural numbers, where
TMA∗ is the Turing-machine defined by A
∗(t∗1, . . . , t
∗
n).
7.3 Defining truth under an interpretation
Further, both IPA(Standard/Tarski) and IPA(βrouwer/Turing) identically define
the satisfaction and truth of the compound formulas of PA inductively as usual
under the corresponding interpretation as follows:
(2) A sequence s satisfies [¬A] under IPA(Standard/Tarski)/IPA(βrouwer/Turing)
if, and only if, s does not satisfy [A];
(3) A sequence s satisfies [A→ B] under IPA(Standard/Tarski)/IPA(βrouwer/Turing)
if, and only if, either s does not satisfy [A], or s satisfies B;
137[Tu36].
138cf. [Me64], pp.50-52.
139See [Me64], p.209; [Ma54].
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(4) A sequence s satisfies [(∀xi)A] under IPA(Standard/Tarski)/IPA(βrouwer/Turing)
if, and only if, every denumerable sequence in the domainD of IPA(Standard/Tarski)
/IPA(βrouwer/Turing) which differs from s in at most the i’th component satisfies
A;
(5) A well-formed formula A of PA is true under IPA(Standard/Tarski)/IPA(βrou−
wer /Turing) if, and only if, every denumerable sequence in the domain D of
IPA(Standard/Tarski)/IPA(βrouwer/Turing) satisfies A;
(6) A well-formed formula A of PA is false under IPA(Standard/Tarski)/IPA(βro−
uwer/Turing) if, and only if, no sequence in the domainD of IPA(Standard/Tarski)/
IPA(βrouwer/Turing) satisfies A.
7.4 Interpreting the universal quantifier effectively
It follows from these definitions that:
(7) Tarskian universality: A PA-formula such as [(∀x)A(x)] interprets as true
under IPA(Standard/Tarski) if, and only if, for any given natural number n, A
∗(n)
is true, where A∗(x) is the interpretation of [A(x)] under IPA(Standard/Tarski);
(7a) Markovian universality: A PA-formula such as [(∀x)A(x)] interprets as
true under IPA(Markov) if, and only if, there is a Markov algorithm that, for
any given natural number n, will establish A∗(n) as true, where A∗(x) is the
interpretation of [A(x)] under IPA(Standard/Tarski);
(7b) Brouwer-Turing universality: A PA-formula such as [(∀x)A(x)] in-
terprets as true under IPA(βrouwer/Turing) if, and only if, for any given nat-
ural number n, the Turing-machine TMA∗ computes A
∗(n)—when treated as
a Boolean function—as true, where A∗(x) is the interpretation of [A(x)] under
IPA(Standard/Tarski), and TMA∗ is the Turing-machine defined by the quantifier-
free expression in the prenex normal form of A∗.
7.5 Interpreting the existential quantifier effectively
Further:
(8) Tarskian particularisation: A PA-formula such as [(∃x)A(x)]—the ab-
breviation for [¬(∀x)¬A(x)]—interprets as true under IPA(Standard/Tarski) if,
and only if, it is not true that, for any given natural number n, A∗(n) is false,
where A∗(x) is the interpretation of [A(x)] under IPA(Standard/Tarski), and we
may conclude that there exists some natural number n such that A∗(n) holds;
(8a) Markovian particularisation: A PA-formula such as [(∃x)A(x)]—the
abbreviation for [¬(∀x)¬A(x)]—interprets as true under IPA(Markov) if, and
only if, it is not true that there is an Markov algorithm that, for any given
natural number n, will establish A∗(n) as false, where A∗(x) is the interpreta-
tion of [A(x)] under IPA(Standard/Tarski), but we may not conclude that there
exists some natural number n such that A∗(n) holds (since A∗(x) may be an
instantiationally, but not algorithmically, decidable relation such that, for any
given natural number n, A∗(n) is false);
(8b) Brouwer-Turing particularisation: A PA-formula such as [(∃x)A(x)]—
the abbreviation of [¬(∀x)¬A(x)]—interprets as true under IPA(βrouwer/Turing)
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if, and only if, it is not true that, for any given natural number n, the Turing-
machine TMA∗ computes A
∗(n)—when treated as a Boolean function—as false,
where A∗(x) is the interpretation of [A(x)] under IPA(Standard/Tarski), and
TMA∗ is the Turing-machine defined by the quantifier-free expression in the
prenex normal form of A∗, but we may not conclude that there exists some
natural number n such that A∗(n) holds (since A∗(x) may be a Halting-type of
relation such that, for any given natural number n, A∗(n) is false).
7.6 The finitary interpretation IPA(βrouwer/Turing) of PA is
sound
Now, the PA-axioms PA1 to PA8—which do not involve any quantification—
interpret straightforwardly as Turing-computably always-true arithmetical re-
lations under IPA(βrouwer/Turing).
Further, for any given PA-formula [F (x)], the Induction axiom schema PA9
interprets under IPA(βrouwer/Turing) as a tautology, since:
‘[F (0) ∨ (∀x)(F (x)→ F (x′))] is true under IPA(βrouwer/Turing)’
‘[(∀x)F (x)] is true under IPA(βrouwer/Turing)’
both mean:
‘For any given natural number n, the Turing-machine TMF∗ com-
putes F ∗(n) as true’
where F ∗(x) is the interpretation of [F (x)] under IPA(βrouwer/Turing).
Similarly, Generalisation too interprets under IPA(βrouwer/Turing) as a tau-
tology since, again:
‘[F (x)] is true (i.e., satisfied for any given x) under IPA(βrouwer/Turing)’
‘[(∀x)F (x)] is true under IPA(βrouwer/Turing)’
both mean:
‘For any given natural number n, the Turing-machine TMF∗ com-
putes F ∗(n) as true’
where F ∗(x) is the interpretation of [F (x)] under IPA(βrouwer/Turing).
It is also straightforward to show that Modus Ponens preserves truth under
IPA(βrouwer/Turing).
Thus the axioms of PA are constructively satisfied/true under the finitary
interpretation IPA(βrouwer/Turing), and the rules of inference of PA preserve the
properties of satisfaction/truth under IPA(βrouwer/Turing).
It follows that:
Theorem 4 : If a formula [F ] is a theorem of a first-order Peano Arith-
metic then there is a Turing-machine TMF that will compute the arithmetical
proposition—or relation—F as true—or always true (i.e., true for any natu-
ral number values assigned to the free variables of F ), respectively—in a finite
number of steps.
Hence the finitary interpretation IPA(βrouwer/Turing) of PA is sound, and so
it defines a finitary model of PA.
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7.6.1 IPA(βrouwer/Turing) settles the Poincare´-Hilbert debate
Moreover, since IPA(βrouwer/Turing) highlights the tautological character of both
the Generalisation rule of inference and the Induction Schema in PA, it settles
the Poincare´-Hilbert debate in the latter’s favour. Poincare´ maintained that the
consistency of the method of induction could never be proven except through
the inductive method itself; Hilbert believed a finitary proof of the consistency
of PA was possible140.
The above analysis suggests that their difference resolves in Hilbert’s favour
once we explicitly differentiate between ‘For all . . . ’—which implicitly, but unin-
tendedly, implies algorithmic (and, ipso facto, instantiational) verifiability—and
‘For any given . . . ’—which implies only instantiational verifiability.
7.7 The introduction of an algorithmic method for the
decidability of satisfaction and truth under Tarski’s
definitions is necessary
The question arises: Is the introduction of an algorithmic method for the de-
cidability of satisfaction and truth under Tarski’s definitions necessary?
I give an affirmative answer by defining a formal interpretation IPA(Go¨del)
of PA, and show that—as Brouwer maintained—unrestricted interpretation of
the universal quantifier can also lead to an inconsistency141.
I define satisfaction under IPA(Go¨del) as:
(1c) Go¨delian satisfiability: If [A(t1, . . . , tn)] is an atomic well-formed for-
mula of PA then the sequence of PA-terms [a1], . . . , [an] satisfies [A(t1, . . . , tn)]
under IPA(Go¨del) if, and only if, [A(a1, . . . , an)] is PA-provable.
The satisfaction and truth of the compound formulas of PA are defined
inductively under the interpretation IPA(Go¨del) as usual by (2) to (6) above.
If we accept that (1c) is a consistent definition of satisfiability, then it is
straightforward to show that IPA(Go¨del) is sound.
Now, it also follows from the definitions (1c) and (2) to (6) that:
(7c) Go¨delian universality: A PA-formula such as [(∀x)A(x)] interprets as
true under IPA(Go¨del) if, and only if, for any given numeral [n], [A(n)] is PA-
provable;
(8c) Go¨delian particularisation: A PA-formula such as [(∃x)A(x)]—the ab-
breviation for [¬(∀x)¬A(x)]—interprets as true under IPA(Go¨del) if, and only if,
it is not true that for any given numeral [n], [¬A(n)] is PA-provable.
Further, we have shown above that we can construct a Go¨delian PA-formula
[R(x)] such that:
(i) [(∀x)R(x)] is not PA-provable;
(ii) [¬(∀x)R(x)] is PA-provable;
(iii) for any given numeral [n], [R(n)] is PA-provable.
However, if IPA(Go¨del) is sound, then (ii) implies that it is not the case that,
for any given numeral [n], [R(n)] is PA-provable. It follows that IPA(Go¨del), too,
140See [Hi27], p.472; also [We27], p482; [Br13], p.59.
141[Br08]; see also [Br23], p.336; [Br27], p.491; [We27], p.483.
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is not sound even though—unlike IPA(Standard/Tarski)—IPA(Go¨del) defines par-
ticularisation logically, and not platonically as Aristotle did (possibly influenced
by his teacher Plato).
We conclude that if an interpretation of PA lacks specification of an effec-
tive method for determining the satisfaction of the atomic formulas of PA in
definitions (1) and (1c), then this lack is reflected in the non-constructivity of
definitions (4) to (6) under IPA(Standard/Tarski) and IPA(Go¨del); these are, then,
not sufficient to distinguish between arithmetical relations that are algorithmi-
cally decidable, and those—such as Go¨del’s R(x)—that are instantiationally,
but not algorithmically, decidable.
7.8 PA is categorical: A Provability Theorem for PA
I now show that PA is categorical, and can have no non-standard model, since
it is ‘algorithmically’ complete in the sense that:
Theorem 5 (Provability Theorem for PA): A total arithmetical relation F (x)—
when treated as a Boolean function—defines a Turing-machine TMF which com-
putes F (x) as always true (i.e., true for any given natural number input n) if,
and only if, the corresponding PA-formula [F (x)] is PA-provable.
Proof : It follows from Turing’s seminal 1936 paper 142 that every quantifier-
free arithmetical relation F (x) (when interpreted as a Boolean function) defines
a Turing-machine TMF
143 such that F (x) is TMF -computable if, and only if,
for any given natural number n, TMF will compute F (n) as either true, or as
false, over the structure N .
Now, we have that:
(a) [(∀x)F (x)] is defined as true under the interpretation IPA(βrouwer/Turing)
if, and only if, the Turing-machine TMF computes F (n) as always true
(i.e., as true for any given natural number n) under IPA(βrouwer/Turing);
(b) [(∃x)F (x)] is an abbreviation of [¬(∀x)¬F (x)], and is defined as true
under IPA(βrouwer/Turing) if, and only if, it is not the case that the Turi-
ng-machine TMF computes F (n) as always false (i.e., as false for any
given natural number n) under IPA(βrouwer/Turing).
Moreover, since IPA(βrouwer/Turing) is sound, it defines a finitary model of
PA over N—say MPA(β)—such that:
If [(∀x)F (x)] is PA-provable, then the Turing-machine TMF computes F (n)
as always true (i.e., as true for any given natural number n) in MPA(β);
If [¬(∀x)F (x)] is PA-provable, then it is not the case that the Turing-machine
TMF computes F (n) as always true (i.e., as true for any given natural number
n) in MPA(β).
Further, we cannot have that both [(∀x)F (x)] and [¬(∀x)F (x)] are PA-
unprovable for some PA-formula F (x), as this would yield the contradiction:
142[Tu36].
143In the general case, TMF is defined by the quantifier-free expression in the prenex normal
form of F (x); cf. [Tu36], pp. 138-139
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(i) There is a finitary model—say M1β—of PA+[(∀x)F (x)] in which the
Turing-machine TMF computes F (n) as always true (i.e., as true for
any given natural number n).
(ii) There is a finitary model—say M2β—of PA+[¬(∀x)F (x)] in which it is
not the case that the Turing-machine TMF computes F (n) as always
true (i.e., as true for any given natural number n).
Hence PA is ‘algorithmically’ complete, in the sense that a total arithmetical
relation F (x)—when treated as a Boolean function—defines a Turing-machine
TMF which computes F (x) as always true if, and only if, the corresponding
PA-formula [F (x)] is PA-provable144 ✷
Hence PA can have no ‘non-standard’ model, and we have that:
Corollary 2 : PA is categorical.
7.8.1 The significance of the Provability Theorem for PA
The Provability Theorem for PA is of particular interest computationally, since it
formally expresses some implicitly held beliefs in interpretations of computabil-
ity theory. For instance, in their paper ‘Passages of Proof’145, the authors hold
that:
Classically, there are two equivalent ways to look at the mathemati-
cal notion of proof: logical, as a finite sequence of sentences strictly
obeying some axioms and inference rules, and computational, as a
specific type of computation. Indeed, from a proof given as a se-
quence of sentences one can easily construct a Turing-machine pro-
ducing that sequence as the result of some finite computation and,
conversely, given a machine computing a proof we can just print all
sentences produced during the computation and arrange them into
a sequence.
In other words, the authors seem to hold—echoing the sense of the Prov-
ability Theorem for PA—that Turing-computability of a ‘proof’, in the case of
an arithmetical proposition, is equivalent to provability of its representation in
PA.
7.8.2 Go¨del’s arithmetical relation R(n) is effectively computable as
true for any given natural number n, but it is not Turing-
computable as true for any given natural number n
Another significant consequence is that the Provability Theorem for PA provides
an intuitively plausible explanation for the fact that—following Go¨del—we can
define an arithmetical relation R(n) that is true for any given natural number
n, but the corresponding PA-formula [R(x)] is not PA-provable146.
144Note that [(∀x)F (x)] is PA-provable if, and only if, [F (x)] is PA-provable.
145[CCS01], p.13.
146[Go31], p25(1).
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(By Generalisation147, stating that the PA-formula [R(x)] is not PA-provable
is equivalent to stating that the PA-formula [(∀x)R(x)]148 is not PA-provable;
the latter is what Go¨del actually proved for his formal system of Peano Arith-
metic P.)
It simply means that, given any natural number n, R(n) is true but—as a
consequence of the Provability Theorem for PA—the Turing-machine TMR does
not compute R(n) as always true (i.e., true for any given natural number n).
The counter-part of this statement in PA can be expressed as:
Given any PA-numeral [n], there is always some PA-deduction Dn—
i.e., a finite proof-sequence of PA-formulas—whose last formula is
[R(n)], but there is no common deduction D which is independent
of [n], i.e., there is no proof-sequence of PA-formulas whose last
formula is [R(x)], so [R(x)] is PA-unprovable.
In other words we have as a consequence of the Provability Theorem for PA
that:
Theorem 6 : (First Tautology Theorem) The Turing-machine TMR does not
compute the tautology R(n)—when treated as a Boolean function—as always
true (i.e., true for any given natural number n).
Proof : In his seminal 1931 paper149, Go¨del has constructed an arithmeti-
cal relation R(n) that is meta-mathematically provable as true for any given
natural number n but — since the corresponding PA-formula [R(x)]150 is not
PA-provable151—it follows from the Provability Theorem for PA that there is
no Turing-machine TMR that computes R(n) as always true (i.e. true for any
given natural number n).✷
7.8.3 P6=NP
The First Tautology Theorem has a curious consequence concerning the cele-
brated PvNP problem152.
In a paper presented to ICM 2002, Ran Raz comments153:
“A Boolean formula f(x1, . . . , xn) is a tautology if f(x1, . . . , xn) = 1
for every x1, . . . , xn. A Boolean formula f(x1, . . . , xn) is unsatisfi-
able if f(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 for every x1, . . . , xn. Obviously, f is a
tautology if and only if ¬f is unsatisfiable.
Given a formula f(x1, . . . , xn), one can decide whether or not f
is a tautology by checking all the possibilities for assignments to
x1, . . . , xn. However, the time needed for this procedure is exponen-
tial in the number of variables, and hence may be exponential in the
length of the formula f . . . .
147Generalisation in PA: [(∀x)F ] follows from [F ].
148Go¨del defines, and refers to, the formula corresponding to this in his formal system P by
its Go¨del-number 17Genr.
149[Go31].
150Go¨del defines, and refers to, this formula by its Go¨del-number r (cf. [Go31], p25, eqn.12).
151[Go31], p25(1).
152[Cook].
153[Ra02].
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P 6=NP is the central open problem in complexity theory and one
of the most important open problems in mathematics today. The
problem has thousands of equivalent formulations. One of these
formulations is the following:
Is there a polynomial time algorithm A that gets as input a Boolean
formula f and outputs 1 if and only if f is a tautology?
P 6=NP states that there is no such algorithm.”
So, if R(n) is constructively computable as a tautology, but not recognisable
as a tautology by any Turing-machine, then, by the First Tautology Theorem:
Corollary 3 : P6=NP!
7.8.4 Is the solution P6=NP significant?
However, the PvNP problem assumes the significance usually accorded to it
only to the extent that its solution throws light on the practical consequences—
mentioned above by Raz—that follow from the computational complexity of a
number-theoretic relation (or function), and not simply from the philosophical
consequences of its logical properties.
The following shows why a trivial logical solution of the PvNP problem—
such as that indicated above, which addresses the problem as it is presently
formulated—may not be significant from a computational complexity perspec-
tive.
7.8.5 Can the PvNP problem be formulated to highlight the signif-
icance of computational complexity?
In his 1931 paper154, Go¨del specifically defined his arithmetical relation R(n)
so that it is instantiationally equivalent to a primitive recursive relation, Q(n),
which, of course, is Turing-computable as true for any given natural number n.
So, even if P 6=NP because PA has no non-standard models, we still have
two number-theoretic relations that are instantiationally equivalent even though
they are not algorithmically (mathematically) identical.
The equivalence should, prima facie, suffice to define the computational com-
plexity involved in one case as notionally equal to that actually involved in the
other.
7.8.6 Why the PvNP problem may remain intractable in ZF
Now, the above distinction between instantiational equivalence and mathemati-
cal identity would be absent in any set-theoretic approach to the PvNP problem
(and hence in its usual set-theoretic interpretation in terms of the classes of de-
cidable and recursively enumerable languages), since it is an axiom of ZF that
two ZF relations (or functions) are instantiationally equivalent if, and only if,
they are set-theoretically (mathematically?) identical.
In other words, if we accept that the consistency of PA implies that P 6=NP,
then, if ZF is consistent, it can neither reflect that P 6=NP nor that P=NP.
154[Go31].
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This suggests that it may be better to reformulate the PvNP problem number-
theoretically so as to avoid trivial logical solutions in PA, or logical blind alleys
in ZF, and to reflect better its computational significance.
7.8.7 The standard Church and Turing Theses
Another consequence of the Provability Theorem for PA is that:
Theorem 7 : (Second Tautology Theorem) Go¨del’s tautology R(n) is construc-
tively computable as always true (i.e., true for any given natural number n).
Proof : Go¨del has defined a primitive recursive relation, xBPAy that holds
if, and only if, y is the Go¨del-number of a PA-formula, say [Y ], and x the
Go¨del-number of a PA-proof of [Y ] ([Go31], p22, dfn. 45).
Since every primitive recursive relation is Turing-computable (when treated
as a Boolean function), xBPAy defines a Turing-machine TMB that halts on
any natural number values of x and y.
Now, if g[R(1)], g[R(2)], . . . are the Go¨del-numbers of the PA-formulas [R(1)],
[R(2)], . . . , it follows that, for any given natural number n, when the natural
number value g[R(n)] is input for y, the Turing-machine TMB must halt for some
value of x—which is the Go¨del-number of some PA-proof of [R(n)]—since Go¨del
has shown155 that [R(n)] is PA-provable for any given numeral [n].
Hence R(n) is constructively computable as true for any given natural num-
ber n. ✷
The Second Tautology Theorem also has an interesting Corollary.
Now, we can show that:
(a) Every Turing-computable function (or relation, treated as a
Boolean function) F is partial recursive , and, if F is total , then F
is recursive156.
(b) Every partial recursive function (or relation, treated as a Boolean
function) is Turing-computable157.
It follows that the following—essentially unverifiable but refutable—theses
are equivalent158:
Standard Church’s Thesis159: A number-theoretic function (or
relation, treated as a Boolean function) is effectively computable if,
and only if, it is partial-recursive160.
Standard Turing’s Thesis161: A number-theoretic function (or
relation, treated as a Boolean function) is effectively computable if,
and only if, it is Turing-computable162.
155[Go31], p25(1).
156cf. [Me64], p.233, Corollary 5.13.
157cf. [Me64], p.237, Corollary 5.15.
158cf. [Me64], p.237.
159Church’s (original) Thesis: The effectively computable number-theoretic functions are
the algorithmically computable number-theoretic functions [Ch36].
160cf. [Me64], p.227.
161After describing what he meant by “computable” numbers in the opening sentence of his
seminal paper on Computable Numbers [Tu36], Turing immediately expressed this thesis—
albeit informally—as: “. . . the computable numbers include all numbers which could naturally
be regarded as computable”.
162cf. [BBJ03], p.33.
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However, it follows from the Second Tautology Theorem that, since there is a
number-theoretic relation which—treated as a Boolean function—is (effectively)
constructively computable but not (algorithmically) Turing-computable:
Theorem 8 : The Church and Turing theses are false.
7.8.8 Church’s Thesis as a weaker equivalence
However, instead of expressing it strongly as a refutable identity, Church’s
Thesis can also be postulated as the weaker—and intuitively more plausible—
equivalence:
Weak Church’s Thesis: A number-theoretic function (or relation,
treated as a Boolean function) is effectively computable if, and only
if, it is instantiationally equivalent to a partial-recursive function.
It is significant that Go¨del (initially) and Church (subsequently - not least
because of Go¨del’s disquietitude) enunciated Church’s formulation of ‘effective
computability’ as a Thesis because Go¨del was instinctively uncomfortable with
accepting it as a definition that fully captures the essence of ‘intuitive effective
computability’163.
Go¨del’s reservations seem vindicated if we accept that a number-theoretic
function can be effectively computable instantiationally, but not algorithmically.
Since every algorithmically computable function is, necessarily, computable
instantiationally, we can now define:
Definition: A number-theoretic function is effectively computable
(intuitively) if, and only if, it is effectively computable instantiation-
ally.
We thus see that, in its standard formulations, Church’s Thesis violates the
doctrine of Occam’s razor by postulating a strong identity—and not simply a
weak equivalence—between an effectively computable number-theoretic function
and some partial recursive function.
Consequently, the Thesis does not admit the possibility of number-theoretic
relations that are constructively computable (i.e., effectively computable in-
stantiationally), but not Turing-computable (i.e., not effectively computable
algorithmically).
8 Cantor and ZF set theory
In this section I consider the belief that all significant mathematical ‘truths’ —
such as, for example, the theorems of a first-order Peano Arithmetic (PA) —
can be interpreted as theorems of a set-theory such as ZF without any loss of
generality.
For instance, in the chapter, “NP and NP completeness”, of their forthcom-
ing book, authors Arora and Barak write that164:
163cf. [Si97]
164[Ar08], p2.24(60), Ex.6, Ch.2.
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Mathematics can be axiomatized using for example the Zermelo
Frankel system, which has a finite description.
That such a belief is almost universal today is a reflection of the fact that—
for over a generation—it has been explicitly echoed in standard texts with in-
creasing certitude:
. . . NBG165 apparently can serve as a foundation for all present-
day mathematics (i.e., it is clear to every mathematician that every
mathematical theorem can be translated and proved within NBG, or
within extensions of NBG obtained by adding various extra axioms
such as the Axiom of Choice) . . .
. . .Mendelson166
Such is the case, for instance, with the formal systems considered in
works on set theory, such as the one known as ZFC, which are ade-
quate for formalizing essentially all accepted mathematical proofs.
. . .Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey167
8.1 Relativising PA in ZF
Now a standard method of interpreting PA in ZF is by relativising PA in ZF168
as follows169:
Given any wf A of formal number theory S170 . . . , we can associate
with A a wf A∗ of NBG171 as follows: first replace every “+” by
“+0”, and every “.”
172 by “×0”173; then, if A is B ⊃ C, or ¬B,
respectively, and we already have found B∗ and C∗, let A∗ be B∗ ⊃
C∗, or ¬(B∗), respectively; if A is (x174)B(x), replace it by (x)(x ∈
ω ⊃ B∗(x). This completes the definition of A∗.
Now, if x1, . . . , xn are the free variables of A, prefix ‘(x1 ⊃ ω ∧ . . .∧
xn ⊃ ω) ⊃’ to A∗, obtaining a wf A#. This amounts to restricting
all variables to ω and interpreting addition, multiplication, and the
successor function on integers as the corresponding operations on
ordinals175.
Then every axiom A of S is transformed into a theorem A# of NBG.
. . . Applications of modus ponens are preserved under the transfor-
mations of A into A#. Also . . . applications of the Generalisation
Rule lead from theorems to theorems.
Therefore, for every theorem A of S, A# is a theorem of NBG, and
we can translate into NBG all the theorems of S . . .
165Also ‘ZF’.
166[Me64], p193.
167[BBJ03], p225.
168By appealing to Cantor’s first limit ordinal, ω.
169cf. [Me64], p192.
170Read as ‘PA’.
171Read as ‘ZF’.
172Read as “⋆”.
173Note that “+0” and “×0” denote ordinal addition and ordinal multiplication.
174Read as ‘∀x’.
175Note that ‘x′’ interprets as ‘x ∪ x’.
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8.2 Can ZF yield all significant mathematical ‘truths’?
However, in a 1992 talk176, Feferman tacitly sounded a cautionary note on an
unqualified understanding — such as that cited above — of the ambit of set-
theory.
. . . ... we are mainly concerned with the relation T1 ≤ T2 when
[theory] T1 is a part of T2, either directly or by translation. In
contrast, T2 tends to be more comprehensive than T1 in the case
of interpretations; a familiar example is Peano Arithmetic (as T1)
in Zermelo-Fraenkel ZF (as T2), where the natural numbers are in-
terpreted as the finite ordinals. This is a conceptual reduction of
number theory to set theory, but not a foundational reduction, be-
cause the latter system is justified only by an uncountable infinitary
framework whereas the former is justified simply by a countable in-
finitary framework.
A significant point which emerges from Feferman’s talk is that we may not
appeal unrestrictedly to set-theoretical reasoning when studying the founda-
tional framework of PA. As we show below, the cautionary element underlying
Feferman’s remarks is particularly relevant when applied to two issues that are
primarily rooted in number-theoretic — and not set-theoretic — concerns.
8.3 Why PA cannot admit a set-theoretical model
Let [G(x)] denote the PA-formula:
[x = 0 ∨ ¬(∀y)¬(x = y′)]
This translates, under every unrelativised interpretation of PA, as:
If x denotes an element in the domain of an unrelativised interpretation of
PA, either x is 0, or x is a ‘successor’.
Further, in every such interpretation of PA, ifG(x) denotes the interpretation
of [G(x)]:
(a) G(0) is true;
(b) If G(x) is true, then G(x′) is true.
Hence, by Go¨del’s completeness theorem:
(c) PA proves [G(0)];
(d) PA proves [G(x)→ G(x′)].
Further, by Generalisation:
(e) PA proves [(∀x)(G(x) → G(x′))];
Hence, by Induction:
(f) [(∀x)G(x)] is provable in PA.
In other words, except 0, every element in the domain of any unrelativised
interpretation of PA is a ‘successor’. Further, x can only be a ‘successor’ of a
unique element in any such interpretation of PA.
176[Fe92].
36
8.3.1 PA and ZF have no common model
Now, since Cantor’s first limit ordinal, ω, is not the ‘successor’ of any ordinal in
the sense required by the PA axioms, and if there are no infinitely descending
sequences of ordinals177 in a model—if any—of set-theory, PA and Ordinal
Arithmetic178 cannot have a common model, and so we cannot consistently
extend PA to ZF simply by the addition of more axioms.
8.3.2 Why the usual argument for a non-standard model of PA is
unconvincing
Further, although we can define a model of Arithmetic with an infinite descend-
ing sequence of elements179, any such model would be isomorphic to the “true
arithmetic”180 of the integers (negative plus positive), and not to any model of
PA181.
Moreover—as we show in the next section—we cannot assume that we can
consistently add a constant c to PA, along with the denumerable axioms [¬(c =
0)], [¬(c = 1)], [¬(c = 2)], . . . , since this would presume that which is sought
to be proven, viz., that PA has a non-standard model.
We cannot therefore—as suggested in standard texts182—apply the Com-
pactness Theorem and the (upward) Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem to conclude
that PA has a non-standard model!
Compactness Theorem: If every finite subset of a set of sentences has a
model, then the whole set has a model183.
Upward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem: Any set of sentences that has an
infinite model has a non-denumerable model184.
8.4 A formal argument for a non-standard model of PA
The following argument185 attempts to validate the above line of reasoning
suggested by standard texts for the existence of non-standard models of PA:
1. Let <N (the set of natural numbers); = (equality); ′ (the successor fun-
ction); + (the addition function); ∗ (the product function); 0 (the null
element)> be the structure, say [N ], that serves to define a sound int-
erpretation of PA.
2. Let T[N ] be the set of PA-formulas that are satisfied or true in [N ].
3. The PA-provable formulas form a subset of T[N ].
4. Let Γ be the countable set of all PA-formulas of the form [cn = (cn+1)
′],
where the index n is a natural number.
5. Let T be the union of Γ and T[N ].
6. T[N ] plus any finite set of members of Γ has a model, e.g., [N ] itself,
since [N ] is a model of any finite descending chain of successors.
177[Me64], p261.
178[Me64], p.187.
179eg. [BBJ03], Section 25. 1, p303.
180[BBJ03]. p150. Ex. 12. 9.
181[BBJ03]. Corollary 25. 3, p306.
182eg. [BBJ03]. p306; [Me64], p112, Ex. 2.
183[BBJ03]. p147.
184[BBJ03]. p163.
185[Lu08].
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7. Consequently, by Compactness, T has a model; call it M .
8. M has an infinite descending sequence with respect to ′ because it is a
model of Γ.
9. Since PA is a subset of T, M is a non-standard model of PA.
Now, if—as claimed above—[N ] is a model of T[N ] plus any finite set of
members of Γ, then all PA-formulas of the form [cn = (cn+1)
′] are PA-provable,
Γ is a proper sub-set of the PA-provable formulas, and T is identically T[N ].
(The argument cannot be that some PA-formula of the form [cn = (cn+1)
′] is
true in [N ], but not PA-provable, as this would imply that PA+[¬(cn = (cn+1)′)]
has a model other than [N ]; in other words, it would presume that PA has a
non-standard model.186)
Consequently, the postulated modelM of T in (7), by “Compactness”, is the
model [N ] that defines T[N ]. However, [N ] has no infinite descending sequence
with respect to the successor function ′, even though it is a model of Γ. Hence
the argument does not establish the existence of a non-standard model of PA
with an infinite descending sequence with respect to the successor function ′.
8.5 The (upward) Skolem-Lo¨wenheim theorem applies only
to first-order theories that admit an axiom of infinity
We note, moreover, that the non-existence of non-standard models of PA would
not contradict the (upward) Skolem-Lo¨wenheim theorem, since the proof of
this theorem implicitly limits its applicability amongst first-order theories to
those that are consistent with an axiom of infinity—in the sense that the proof
implicitly requires that a constant, say c, along with a denumerable set of axioms
to the effect that c 6= 0, c 6= 1, . . ., can be consistently added to the theory.
However, as seen in the previous section, this is not the case with PA.
8.6 Why PA has no set-theoretical model
We can define the usual order relation ‘<’ in PA so that every instance of the
Induction Axiom schema, such as, say:
(i) [F (0)→ ((∀x)(F (x) → F (x′))→ (∀x)F (x))]
yields the PA theorem:
(ii) [F (0)→ ((∀x)((∀y)(y < x→ F (y))→ F (x))→ (∀x)F (x))]
186The same objection applies to the usual argument found in standard texts (eg. [BBJ03].
p306; [Me64], p112, Ex. 2.) which, again, is essentially that, if PA has a non-standard model
at all, then one such model is obtained by assuming we can consistently add a single non-
numeral constant c to the language of PA, and the countable axioms c 6= 0, c 6= 1, c 6= 2, . . . to
PA. However, as noted earlier, this argument too does not resolve the question of whether
such assumption validly allows us to conclude that there is a non-standard model of PA in
the first place.
To place this distinction in perspective, Legendre and Gauss independently conjectured
in 1796 that, if π(x) denotes the number of primes less than x, then π(x) is asymptotically
equivalent to x/In(x). Between 1848/1850, Chebyshev confirmed that if π(x)/{x/In(x)} has a
limit, then it must be 1. However, the crucial question of whether π(x)/{x/In(x)} has a limit
at all was answered in the affirmative independently by Hadamard and de la Valle´e Poussin
only in 1896.
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Now, if we interpret PA without relativisation in ZF in the sense indicated
by Feferman187 — i.e., numerals as finite ordinals, [x′] as [x∪{x}], etc. — then
(ii) always translates in ZF as a theorem:
(iii) [F (0)→ ((∀x)((∀y)(y ∈ x→ F (y))→ F (x))→ (∀x)F (x))]
However, (i) does not always translate similarly as a ZF-theorem (which
is why PA and ZF can have no common model), since the following is not
necessarily provable in ZF:
(iv) [F (0)→ ((∀x)(F (x) → F (x ∪ {x}))→ (∀x)F (x))]
Example: Define [F (x)] as ‘[x ∈ ω]’.
A significant point which emerges from the above is that we cannot ap-
peal unrestrictedly to set-theoretical reasoning when studying the foundational
framework of PA.
Reason: The language of PA has no constant that interprets in any model
of PA as the set N of all natural numbers.
Moreover, the preceding sections show that the Induction Axiom Schema of
PA does not allow us to bypass this constraint by introducing an ‘actual’ (or
‘completed’) infinity disguised as an arbitrary constant - usually denoted by c
or ∞ - into either the language, or a putative model, of PA.
8.7 The case against Goodstein’s interpretation of his own
set-theoretic reasoning
The significance of the preceding observations is seen in the following analysis
of Goodstein’s Theorem, which illustrates why we need to differentiate between
theorems in PA and theorems in Ordinal Arithmetic.
Now, in a 1944 paper, R. L. Goodstein188, considers, for any given natural
number m, the sequence, G(m), of natural numbers:
G(m) ≡ {m1<2>,m2<3>,m3<4>, . . .} (1)
where m1<2> denotes the unique hereditary representation of the natural num-
ber m in the natural number base 2:
e. g. 91<2> ≡ 1.21.2
1.20+1.20 + 0.21.2
1.20+0.20 + 0.21.2
0
+ 1.20
and, for n > 2, mn<n+1> is defined recursively from m(n−1)<n> as below.
8.7.1 The recursive definition of Goodstein’s sequence
For n > 2, we express m(n−1)<n> syntactically by its hereditary representation
as:
m(n−1)<n> ≡
l∑
i=0
ai.n
i<n> (2)
where:
187[Fe92].
188[Gd44].
39
(a) 0 ≤ ai < n over 0 ≤ i ≤ l;
(b) al 6= 0;
(c) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ l, the exponent i, too, is expressed syntactically
by its hereditary representation, i<n>, in the base n; so, also,
are all of its exponents, and, in turn, all of their exponents, etc.
Then, if a0 6= 0:
mn<n+1> ≡
l∑
i=1
(ai.(n+ 1)
i<n+1>) + (a0 − 1) (3)
Whilst, if ai = 0 for all 0 ≤ i < k:
mn<n+1> ≡
l∑
i=k+1
(ai.(n+ 1)
i<n+1>) + ck (4)
where:
ck = ak.(n+ 1)
k − 1
= (ak − 1).(n+ 1)
k +
{
(n+ 1)k − 1
}
= (ak − 1).(n+ 1)
k + n
{
(n+ 1)k−1 + (n+ 1)k−2 . . .+ 1
}
and, so, its hereditary representation, in the base (n+ 1), is of the form:
(ak − 1).(n+ 1)
k<n+1> + n
{
(n+ 1)k1<n+1> + (n+ 1)k2<n+1> . . .+ 1
}
where k > k1 > k2 > . . . ≥ 1.
8.7.2 Some basic properties of Goodstein’s sequence
For n > 1, we consider the difference:
d(n−1) =
{
m(n−1)<n> −mn<n+1>
}
Now, if a0 6= 0, we have:
d(n−1) =
l∑
i=0
(ai.n
i<n>)−
l∑
i=1
(ai.(n+ 1)
i<n+1>)− (a0 − 1) (5)
Whilst, if ai = 0 for all 0 ≤ i < k, we have:
d(n−1) =
l∑
i=k
(ai.n
i<n>)−
l∑
i=(k+1)
(ai.(n+ 1)
i<n+1>)−
(ak − 1).(n+ 1)
k<n+1> −
n
{
(n+ 1)k1<n+1> + (n+ 1)k2<n+1> . . .+ 1
}
(6)
Further, if, in equation (5), we replace the base < n > by the base < z > in the
term:
l∑
i=0
ai.n
i<n> (7)
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and the base < n+ 1 > also by the base < z > in the term:
l∑
i=k+1
(ai.(n+ 1)
i<n+1>) + (a0 − 1) (8)
we have:
d′(n−1) =
l∑
i=0
(ai.z
i<z>)−
l∑
i=1
(ai.z
i<z>)− (a0 − 1)
= 1 (9)
Whilst if, in equation (6), we replace the bases similarly, we have:
d′(n−1) =
l∑
i=k
(ai.z
i<z>)−
l∑
i=(k+1)
(ai.z
i<z>)−
(ak − 1).z
k<z> − n
{
zk1<z> + zk2<z> . . .+ 1
}
= ak.z
k<z> − (ak − 1).z
k<z>)− n(zk1<z> + zk2<z> . . .+ 1)
= zk<z> − n(zk1<z> + zk2<z> . . .+ 1) (10)
where k > k1 > k2 > . . . ≥ 1.
We consider, now, the sequence:
Z(m) ≡ (m1<2|z>,m2<3|z>,m3<4|z>, . . .)
obtained from Goodstein’s sequence by replacing the base < n+1 >, in each of
the terms, mn<n+1>, by the base < z > for all n ≥ 1.
Clearly, if z > n for all non-zero terms of the Goodstein sequence, then
d′(n−1) > 0 in either of the cases - equation (9) or equation (10).
The sequence Z(m) is, then, a descending sequence of natural numbers, and
must terminate finitely.
Since mn<(n+1)|z> is also, then, always greater than mn<n+1>, Goodstein’s
sequence too must terminate finitely in this case.
Further, since we can always find a bound z > n for all non-zero terms of the
Goodstein sequence if it terminates finitely, the condition that we can always
find some bound z > n for all non-zero terms of any Goodstein sequence is, thus,
equivalent to the assumption that any Goodstein sequence terminates finitely.
8.7.3 Goodstein’s set-theoretic argument
Now Goodstein’s argument is that, if we interpret z as the first limit ordinal,
ω and—instead of the natural number sequence, Z(m)—consider the similarly
defined ordinal sequence (where 1o, 2o, . . . denote the finite ordinals):
Oo(mo) ≡
{
m1o<2o|ω>,m2o<3o|ω>,m3o<4o|ω>, . . .
}
then, since we can show that the sequence is monotonically decreasing—and if
we accept189 that there are no infinitely descending sequences of ordinals in any
189[Me64], p261.
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model of ZF190—every Goodstein sequence defined similarly as above, but over
the finite ordinals:
Go(mo) ≡ {m1o<2o>,m2o<3o>,m3o<4o>, . . .} (11)
necessarily terminates finitely in every model of ZF.
8.7.4 Goodstein’s conclusion
Goodstein concludes from this that, since the finite ordinals are isomorphic to
the natural numbers, we can assume that every Goodstein sequence defined over
the natural numbers must also terminate finitely.
Now, this conclusion implicitly assumes that any entailment in ZF involving
the ordinal inequality ω >o no for all finite ordinals no ≥ 1o, translates validly
as an entailment in PA involving the natural number inequality z > n for all
natural numbers n ≥ 1 that index a non-zero term of a Goodstein sequence.
In other words, Goodstein’s argument implies that we need not bother to
establish a proof that some natural number bound, z > n, always exists for
all non-zero terms of any Goodstein sequence in order to conclude that the
sequence terminates, even though the latter condition—as we have shown—is,
both, necessary and sufficient if a Goodstein sequence defined over the natural
numbers is to terminate finitely.
8.7.5 The flaw in Goodstein’s argument
The flaw in this argument is highlighted if we assume that the Goodstein se-
quence G(k) does not terminate for some natural number k.
Then, for any given natural number u, we can find a natural number zu
such that, for n < u, the n’th term kn<(n+1)|zu> of the sequence (Zu)k is always
greater than the n’th term kn<n+1> of the Goodstein sequence G(k), and, by
definition, there is a 1-1 correspondence between the terms of the two sequences.
Further, it follows from the previous section that these first u terms of the
sequence (Zu)k are monotonically decreasing.
Now, by definition, the terms of the monotonically decreasing ordinal se-
quence in Goodstein’s argument:
Oo(ko) ≡
{
k1o<2o|ω>, k2o<3o|ω>, k3o<4o|ω>, . . .
}
are also in 1-1 correspondence with the terms of G(k).
However, by Goodstein’s argument, the ordinal sequence Oo(ko) must termi-
nate finitely in any model of ZF even in this case, although we have shown that
the number of monotonically decreasing terms in the natural number sequence
(Zu)k can be made arbitrarily large by a suitable choice of u!
Now, since we have shown that ZF and PA can have no common model, it
follows that either ZF is inconsistent or, even if it is consistent and has a model,
we cannot conclude that the natural number Goodstein sequence G(k) must
terminate finitely simply because Goodstein’s corresponding ordinal sequence
Oo(ko) would terminate finitely in a putative model of ZF.
190Note that such an assertion can only be made in a model
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8.7.6 Analysing Goodstein’s Theorem
Formally, Goodstein’s argument would be that—accepting there are no infinitely
descending sequences of ordinals in any model of ZF—the descending sequence
of ordinal numbers:
Oo(mo) ≡
{
m1o<2o|ω>,m2o<3o|ω>,m3o<4o|ω>, . . .
}
must terminate finitely in any model of ZF for any given finite ordinal mo.
Hence, the following formula—where xz<z+1o> is the z
th term of the ordinal
Goodstein sequence Go(x)—is provable in ZF:
[(∀x)((x ∈ ω)→ (∃z)((z ∈ ω) ∧ xz<z+1o> = 0))]
since the formula would hold in every model of ZF.
Goodstein’s Theorem is, then, the conclusion that:
(∃z)(nz<z+1> = 0)
holds for any given natural number n in the ‘standard’ interpretation of PA.
8.7.7 Why Goodstein’s argument is intuitionistically objectionable
If we accept the formal expression of Goodstein’s argument outlined above as
faithful, then Goodstein’s conclusion, first, mistakenly presumes that the for-
mula ‘[(∃x) . . .]’—which is an abbreviation for the formula ‘[¬(∀x)¬ . . .]’—can
always be interpreted consistently as Aristotle’s particularisation ‘(∃x) . . .’—
which is an abbreviation for ‘There is an/some x such that . . . ’—under a sound
interpretation of any first-order theory that ‘contains’ Peano Arithmetic191.
Second, Goodstein’s conclusion makes the intuitionistically objectionable
presumption that ZF is consistent and has a model, which then allows the in-
ference that the ordinal sequence Oo(mo) is well-defined and terminates finitely
in some model of ZF.
The intuitionistically objectionable element is highlighted by the following
argument.
We can define the ordinal wo such that it is the smallest ordinal larger than
mio<(i+1)o> for all io > 1o in the Goodstein sequence defined for the finite
ordinal mo:
Go(mo) ≡ {m1o<2o>,m2o<3o>,m3o<4o>, . . .} (12)
Now, if Go(mo) terminates finitely, then wo is a finite ordinal. If, however,
Go(mo) does not terminate finitely, then it follows that the sequence of ordinals:
Wo(mo) ≡
{
m1o<2o|wo>,m2o<3o|wo>,m3o<4o|wo>, . . .
}
does not terminate.
Since wo is then, by definition, the first limit ordinal ω–and so Wo(mo) is
the monotonically decreasing sequence of ordinals Oo(mo)—it follows by the
191In the sense that every recursive relation can be expressed in the theory in Go¨del’s sense
(cf. [Go31] p28(2)).
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constructive argument given above that whether the ordinal sequence Oo(mo)
terminates finitely or not in a model of ZF is a consequence of whether the
sequence Go(mo) terminates finitely or not in the model.
However, it then follows that Goodstein must appeal to a non-constructive—
hence intuitionistically objectionable—interpretation in order to conclude that
there is a model of ZF with no infinitely descending sequences of ordinals!
8.8 ZF is inconsistent
The blurring of the distinction between theorems in Ordinal Arithmetic and
PA—as reflected in the accepted interpretation of Goodstein’s argument—can
be viewed as another instance of Nathanson’s ‘boss’ factor; one, moreover, that
may have handicapped the various attempts over the last century to establish
that ZF is inconsistent192.
I now show how the inconsistency of ZF follows straightforwardly from the
Provability Theorem for PA.
8.8.1 Go¨del’s R(x) is a Halting-type of relation
Prima facie, one reason193 that R(x) is constructively computable as always
true but not Turing-computable as always true may be that, following Go¨del, we
define R(x)—more accurately, R(x, p)194—as instantiationally equivalent to the
primitive recursive relationQ(x)—more accurately,Q(x, p)195—in a deliberately
self-referential way that involves an implicit circularity.
The circularity is implicit in the definition of Q(x, y)196, whose domain in-
cludes the Go¨del-number of the PA-formula [R(x, y)]. Hence, the definition of
Q(x, p)197 implicitly references the range of values of R(x, p).
As a consequence, there may be some natural number n such that, when
computing R(n, p), the Turing-machine TMR that computes R(x, p) does not
halt, but goes into a non-terminating (machine-generated, but not program-
192For instance, the efforts by the ultra-intuitionist Alexander Yessinin-Volpin’s group to
show that ZF is inconsistent.
193Another is considered in Appendix D.
194Go¨del refers to the corresponding formula [R(x, y)] of his formal system P only by its
Go¨del-number q, to the P-formula [(∀x)R(x, y)] by its Go¨del-number p, and to the P-formula
[R(x, p)] by its Go¨del-number r.
195Go¨del defines Q(x, y)—with reference to his formal system P and his chosen system of
Go¨del-numbering ([Go31], pp.9-14)—as the primitive recursive relation which translates as:
‘x is not the Go¨del-number of a proof-sequence in P whose last formula is obtained from
the formula whose Go¨del-number is y by substituting the P-numeral that represents y for
the P-variable whose Go¨del-number is 19’ [Go31], p.24(8.1). He implicitly defines R(x, y)
as the corresponding arithmetical relation by appeal to his Theorem VII [Go31]. It is also
implicit in Go¨del’s reasoning that [R(x, y)] is the P-formula that interprets under the standard
interpretation of P as the arithmetical relation R(x, y). Since Go¨del’s definition of R(x, y)—by
appeal to his Theorem VII—contains existential assertions expressed by means of the usual
existential symbol ‘∃’, his reasoning—as also that of Rosser [Ro36].—implicitly assumes that
the standard interpretation of P is sound, and so every occurence of the P-symbol [∃] in the
P-formula [R(x, y)] interprets as the concept defined by Hilbert’s ǫ-symbol—and denoted by
the shorthand notation ‘∃’—in the interpreted arithmetical relation R(x, y).
196cf. [Go31] p24(8.1)
197The primitive recursive relation denoted by Q(x, p) translates as: ‘x is not the Go¨del-
number of a proof-sequence in P, the last formula of which is [(∀x)R(x, y)]’.
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generated) loop, on the input n, since an instantaneous tape description198
repeats itself.
Non-terminating loop: A non-terminating loop is defined as any repetition of
the instantaneous tape description of a Turing-machine during a computation.
8.8.2 Turing’s Halting problem
Now, in his seminal paper on computable numbers, Turing considers199 the
Halting problem, which is a more general case of the above, and which can be
expressed as the query200:
Halting problem for TM: Given a Turing-machine TM, can one
effectively decide, given any instantaneous description alpha, whether
or not there is a computation of TM beginning with alpha?
Turing then shows that the Halting problem is unsolvable by a Turing-
machine201. Since a function is Turing-computable if, and only if, it is par-
tial recursive202, it is essentially unverifiable algorithmically whether or not a
Turing-machine that computes a random n-ary, number-theoretic function will
halt on every n-ary sequence of natural numbers as input, and not go into a
non-terminating loop on some input.
Now we note that any Turing-machine can be provided with an effective
looping oracle— in the form of an auxiliary infinite tape203—that will effectively
recognise a non-terminating looping situation and abort the computation.
Effective Looping oracle: An auxiliary device that records every instanta-
neous tape description at the execution of each machine instruction of a Turing-
machine, and compares the current instantaneous tape description with the
record. If an instantaneous tape description is repeated, the oracle aborts the
computation of the Turing-machine on the impending non-terminating loop, and
returns a meta-symbol indicating self-termination as an output of the Turing-
machine.
8.8.3 If ZF is consistent, then the Halting problem is effectively
solvable by a Turing-machine
All of the foregoing reasoning leads to a curious consequence:
Theorem 9 : If ZF is consistent, then it can be effectively determined whether,
or not, given any partial recursive number-theoretic function F (x1, ..., xn), the
Turing-machine TMF will halt or not on any given natural number sequence
a1, ..., an as input.
198For a formal definition see, e.g., [Me64], p.230; Turing ([Tu36], §2) refers to it as “. . . the
complete configuration at that stage” of the TM.
199[Tu36], §8.
200cf. [Me64], p256.
201Turing concludes that: “. . . there can be no machine E which, when supplied with the
S.D. of an arbitrary machine M, will determine whether M ever prints a given symbol (0
say)”.
202[Me64], p233, Corollary 5.13 & p237, Corollary 5.15.
203[Rg87], p130.
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Proof : We assume that F is obtained from the recursive function G by means of
the unrestricted µ-operator204, so that F (x1, ..., xn) = µy(G(x1, ..., xn, y) = 0).
Let [H(x1, ..., xn, y)] express ¬(G(x1, ..., xn, y) = 0) in PA, so that for any
given natural number sequence a1, ..., an, b:
If ¬(G(a1, ..., an, b) = 0) is true, then PA proves [H(a1, ..., an, b)]
If (G(a1, ..., an, b) = 0) is true, then PA proves [¬H(a1, ..., an, b)]
We then consider the PA-provability—and truth under a sound interpreta-
tion of PA, such as IPA(βrouwer/Turing)— of the PA-formula [H(a1, ..., an, y)]
for a given sequence of PA-numerals [a1], ..., [an]. Thus:
(a) Let Q1 be the meta-assertion that the Turing-machine TMG
computes G(a1, ..., an, y) as 0 for some y = k.
(b) Next, let Q2 be the meta-assertion that the Turing-machine
TMH that computes the arithmetical relation H(a1, ..., an, y) re-
turns the symbol for self-termination at the occurrence of a non-
terminating loop for some value y = k′.
In other words, given any natural number k′, H(a1, ..., an, k
′) is com-
putable since it is instantiationally equivalent to ¬(G(a1, ..., an, k′) =
0), but the Turing-machine TMH cannot always (i.e., for any given
y) compute H(a1, ..., an, y) since—as in the case of Go¨del’s arith-
metical relation R(x) above—there is some value y = k′ for which
H(a1, ..., an, k
′) references itself.
(c) Finally, let Q3 be the meta-assertion that TMG always (i.e.,
for any given y) computes G(a1, ..., an, y) as non-zero, and that the
Turing-machine TMH also computes H(a1, ..., an, y) as always true
(i.e., true for any given y).
Now, if we assume the Provability Theorem for PA, then it follows
that [H(a1, ..., an, y)] is PA-provable. Let h be the Go¨del-number
of [H(a1, ..., an, y)]. We consider, then, Go¨del’s primitive recursive
number-theoretic relation uBPAv
205, which holds if, and only if, u
is the Go¨del-number of a proof-sequence in PA for the PA-formula
whose Go¨del-number is v. It follows that there is some finite k′′
such that the Turing-machine TMB will compute uBPAh as true for
u = k′′.
It follows that Q1, Q2, and Q3 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and
that one of the parallel trio TMG, TMH , TMB of Turing-machines will always
halt.
Now:
(i) If TMG halts on y = k, then TMF computes F (a1, ..., an) = k,
and halts on the input a1, ..., an;
(ii) If TMH halts, then two computable number-theoretic relations
that are instantiationally equivalent are not identical. Since PA
can be interpreted in ZF by relativisation206, all of the foregoing
204cf. [Me64], p.121(VI).
205[Go31], p.22, def.45.
206[Me64], pp.192-193.
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reasoning can be interpreted in ZF. However, relations are sets in ZF,
and two relations that are instantiationally equivalent correspond
to two sets that have the same members. Moreover—by a basic
ZF axiom—two sets are equal if, and only if, they have the same
members. Hence, if TMH halts, then ZF is inconsistent;
(iii) If TMB halts, then TMF does not halt on input a1, ..., an, and
F (a1, ..., an) is undefined.
It follows that, if ZF is consistent, then TMH never halts, and the Halting
problem is effectively solvable by a Turing-machine, since TMF can simulate
TMG+TMB. ✷
Since the Halting problem is not solvable algorithmically, i.e., by a Turing-
machine, we conclude that:
Corollary 4 : ZF is inconsistent.
8.8.4 The root of the inconsistency in ZF
Go¨del constructively defined the arithmetical relation R(x) in terms of a primi-
tive recursive predicate Q(x) such that, for any given natural number n, R(n)↔
Q(n). By the ZF axiom of Extensionality, two functions are mathematically
(set-theoretically) identical if they are instantiationally equivalent. However,
whilst Q(x) is algorithmically decidable, R(x) is not. Thus, reflecting Skolem’s
(apparent) paradox, only one of Q(x) and Q(x) defines a set!
Skolem’s (apparent) paradox: In a 1922 address delivered in Helsinki before
the Fifth Congress of Scandinavian Mathematicians, Skolem improved upon both
the argument and statement of Lo¨wenheim’s 1915 theorem207—subsequently
labelled as the (downwards) Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem208. He then drew
attention to a 209:
“. . . peculiar and apparently paradoxical state of affairs. By virtue of the axioms
we can prove the existence of higher cardinalities, of higher number classes, and
so forth. How can it be, then, that the entire domain B can already be enumer-
ated by means of the finite positive integers? The explanation is not difficult
to find. In the axiomatization, “set” does not mean an arbitrarily defined col-
lection; the sets are nothing but objects that are connected with one another
through certain relations expressed by the axioms. Hence there is no contradic-
tion at all if a set M of the domain B is non-denumerable in the sense of the
axiomatization; for this means merely that within B there occurs no one-to-one
mapping Φ of M onto Zo (Zermelo’s number sequence). Nevertheless there ex-
ists the possibility of numbering all objects in B , and therefore also the elements
of M , by means of the positive integers; of course such an enumeration too is a
collection of certain pairs, but this collection is not a “set” (that is, it does not
occur in the domain B).”
9 Appendix A: Hilbert’s interpretation of quan-
tification
Hilbert interpreted quantification in terms of his ε-function as follows210:
207[Lo15], p.235, Theorem 2.
208[Sk22], p.293.
209[Sk22], p.295.
210[Hi27], p.466.
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IV. The logical ε-axiom
13. A(a)→ A(ε(A))
Here ε(A) stands for an object of which the proposition A(a) cer-
tainly holds if it holds of any object at all; let us call ε the logical
ε-function. . . .
1. By means of ε, “all” and “there exists” can be defined, namely,
as follows:
(i) (∀a)A(a)↔ A(ε(¬A))
(ii) (∃a)A(a)↔ A(ε(A)) . . .
On the basis of this definition the ε-axiom IV(13) yields the logical
relations that hold for the universal and the existential quantifier,
such as:
(∀a)A(a)→ A(b) . . . (Aristotle’s dictum),
and:
¬((∀a)A(a))→ (∃a)(¬A(a)) . . . (principle of excluded middle).
Thus, Hilbert’s interpretation of universal quantification — defined in (i) —
is that the sentence (∀x)F (x) holds (under a consistent interpretation I) if, and
only if, F (a) holds whenever ¬F (a) holds for any given a (in I); hence ¬F (a)
does not hold for any a (since I is consistent), and so F (a) holds for any given
a (in I).
Further, Hilbert’s interpretation of existential quantification — defined in
(ii) — is that (∃x)F (x) holds (in I) if, and only if, F (a) holds for some a (in
I).
Brouwer’s objection to such an unqualified interpretation of the existential
quantifier was that, for the interpretation to be considered sound when the do-
main of the quantifiers under an interpretation is infinite, the decidability of the
quantification under the interpretation must be constructively verifiable in some
intuitively and mathematically acceptable sense of the term “constructive”211.
Two questions arise:
(a) Is Brouwer’s objection relevant today?
(b) If so, can we interpret quantification ‘constructively’?
9.1 The standard interpretation IPA(Standard/Tarski) of PA
We consider the standard interpretation, say IPA(Standard/Tarski), of first-order
Peano Arithmetic (PA).
Now, if [(∀x)F (x)] and [(∃x)F (x)] are PA-formulas, and the relation F (x)
is the interpretation under IPA(Standard/Tarski) of the PA-formula [F (x)], then,
in current literature:
(1a) [(∀x)F (x)] is defined as true under IPA(Standard/Tarski) if, and only if,
for any given natural number n, F (n) holds under IPA(Standard/Tarski);
(1b) [(∃x)F (x)] is an abbreviation of [¬(∀x)¬F (x)], and is defined as true
under IPA(Standard/Tarski) if, and only if, it is not the case that, for any
211[Br08].
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given natural number n, ¬F (n) holds under IPA(Standard/Tarski);
(1c) F (n) holds under IPA(Standard/Tarski) for some natural number n if, and
only if, it is not the case that, for any given natural number n, ¬F (n)
holds under IPA(Standard/Tarski).
Since (1a), (1b) and (1c) together interpret [(∀x)F (x)] and [(∃x)F (x)] under
IPA(Standard/Tarski) as intended by Hilbert’s ε-function, they attract Brouwer’s
objection.
This answers question (a).
9.2 A finitary model IPA(βrouwer/Turing) of PA
Clearly, the specific target of Brouwer’s objection is (1c), which appeals to
Platonically non-constructive, rather than intuitively constructive, plausibility.
We can thus re-phrase question (b) more specifically: Can we define an
interpretation of PA over [N ] that does not appeal to (1c)?
Now, it follows from Turing’s seminal 1936 paper on computable numbers
that every quantifier-free arithmetical function (or relation, when interpreted as
a Boolean function) F defines a Turing-machine TM F
212213
Consequently, as shown in a previous section, we can define another inter-
pretation IPA(βrouwer/Turing) over the structure [N ], where:
(2a) [(∀x)F (x)] is defined as true under IPA(βrouwer/Turing) if, and only if,
the Turing-machine TM F computes F (n) as always true (i.e., as true
for any given natural number n) under IPA(βrouwer/Turing);
(2b) [(∃x)F (x)] is an abbreviation of [¬(∀x)¬F (x)], and is defined as true
under IPA(βrouwer/Turing) if, and only if, it is not the case that the
Turing-machine TM F computes F (n) as always false (i.e., as false for
any given natural number n) under IPA(βrouwer/Turing).
IPA(βrouwer/Turing) is a finitary model of PA since we have shown that -
when interpreted suitably - all theorems of first-order PA are constructively
true under IPA(βrouwer/Turing).
This answers question (b).
9.3 Are both interpretations of PA over the structure N
sound?
The structure [N ] can thus be used to define both the standard interpretation
IPA(Standard/Tarski) and a finitary interpretation IPA(βrouwer/Turing) for PA.
However, in the finitary model, from the PA-provability of [¬(∀x)F (x)], we
may only conclude that TM F does not compute F (n) as always true under
IPA(βrouwer/Turing).
We may not conclude further that TM F must compute F (n) as false for
some natural number n, since F (x) may be a Halting-type of function that is
not Turing-computable214.
212In the general case, TMF is defined by the quantifier-free expression in the prenex normal
form of F .
213[Tu36], pp. 138-139.
214eg. [Tu36], pp. 132.
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In other words, we may not conclude from the PA-provability of [¬(∀x)F (x)]
that F (n) does not hold under IPA(βrouwer/Turing) for some natural number n.
The question arises: Are both the interpretations IPA(Standard/Tarski) and
IPA(βrouwer/Turing) of PA over the structure [N ] sound?
9.3.1 PA is ω-inconsistent
Now, Go¨del has constructed215 an arithmetical formula, [R(x)], such that, if PA
is assumed simply consistent, then [R(n)] is PA-provable for any given numeral
[n], but [(∀x)R(x)] is not PA-provable.
Further, he showed that216, if PA is additionally assumed ω-consistent, then
[¬(∀x)R(x)] too is not PA-provable.
Go¨del defined217 PA as ω-consistent if, and only if, there is no PA-formula
[F (x)] for which:
(i) [¬(∀x)F (x)] is PA-provable,
and:
(ii) [F (n)] is PA-provable for any given numeral [n] of PA.
However, we have shown that Go¨del’s reasoning also implies that [¬(∀x)R(x)]
is PA-provable, and so PA is ω-inconsistent!
9.3.2 The interpretation IPA(Standard/Tarski) of PA over the structure
N is not sound
Now, R(n) holds for any given natural number n, since Go¨del has defined
R(x)218 such that R(n) is instantiationally equivalent to a primitive recursive
relation Q(n) which is computable as true under IPA(βrouwer/Turing) for any
given natural number n by the Turing-machine TMQ.
It follows that we cannot admit the standard (Hilbertian) interpretion of
[¬(∀x)R(x)] under IPA(Standard/Tarski) as:
R(n) is false for some natural number n.
In other words, the interpretation IPA(Standard/Tarski) of PA over the struc-
ture [N ] is not sound.
However, we can interpret [¬(∀x)R(x)] under IPA(βrouwer/Turing) as:
It is not the case that the Turing-machine TMR computes R(n) as true
under IPA(βrouwer/Turing) for any given natural number n.
Moreover, the ω-inconsistent PA is consistent with the finitary interpreta-
tion of quantification, as in (2a) and (2b) since we have shown above that the
interpretation IPA(βrouwer/Turing) of PA over the structure [N ] is sound.
9.3.3 Why the interpretation IPA(Standard/Tarski) of PA over N is not
sound
The reason why the interpretation IPA(Standard/Tarski) of PA over the structure
[N ] is not sound lies in the fact that, whereas (1b) and (2b) preserve the logical
215[Go31], pp. 25(1)
216[Go31], pp. 26(2).
217[Go31], pp. 23.
218[Go31], pp. 24.
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properties of formal PA-negation under interpretation under IPA(Standard/Tarski)
and B respectively, the further non-constructive inference in (1c) from (1b) —
to the effect that F (n) must hold under IPA(Standard/Tarski) for some natural
number n — does not, and is the one objected to by Brouwer219.
10 Appendix B: A Deduction Theorem
Now, for any first order theory K, we have the Deduction Theorem:
Theorem 10 : (Deduction Theorem) If [A], [B] are closed well-formed formu-
las of K, and if ⊢K [B] when we assume ⊢K [A], then ⊢K [A→ B].
Proof : (i) The case ⊢K [B] is straightforward, since the K-formula [A → B]
then interprets as true under any sound interpretation IK of K.
(ii) If not ⊢K [B] then, if ⊢K [B] when we assume ⊢K [A], then by definition
there is a sequence [B1], [B2], . . . , [Bn], of well-formed K-formulas such that [B1]
is [A], [Bn] is [B] and, for each i > 1, either [Bi] is an axiom of K or [Bi] is a
direct consequence by some rules of inference of K of the axioms of K and some
of the preceding well-formed formulas in the sequence.
(iia) If, now, [A] is false under a sound interpretation IK of K, then [A→ B]
interprets as vacuously true under IK.
(iib) If, however, [A] is true under a sound interpretation IK of K, then the
sequence [B1], [B2], . . . , [Bn] interprets as a deduction squence under IK; whence
it follows that [A→ B] interprets as true under IK.
In other words, we cannot have that [A] interprets as true, and [B] as false,
under a sound interpretation IK of K, as this would imply that there is some
extension K′ of K in which ⊢K′ [A], but not ⊢K′ [B]; this would contradict
our hypothesis which implies that, in any extension K′ of K in which we have
⊢K′ [A], the sequence [B1], [B2], . . . , [Bn] yields ⊢K′ [B].
Hence, [A → B] interprets as true in all models of K. By a consequence
of Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem for an arbitrary first order theory, it follows
that ⊢K [A→ B]. ✷
10.1 PA is ω-inconsistent
Now, Go¨del has shown220 that we can construct a PA-proposition, [(∀x)R(x)],
such that if the Go¨del-number of [(∀x)R(x)] corresponds to Go¨del’s 17Gen r221,
and if [(∀x)R(x)] is PA-provable, then there is a PA-numeral [n] such that the
PA-formula whose Go¨del-number corresponds to Go¨del’s Neg(Sb(r
17
Z(n)
))—
i.e., the PA-formula [¬R(n)]—is PA-provable if PA is assumed simply consis-
tent222.
Hence the PA-formula whose Go¨del-number corresponds to Go¨del’s Neg(17
Gen r)—i.e., the PA-formula [¬(∀x)R(x)]—is also PA-provable223 if PA is as-
219[Br08].
220[Go31], Theorem VII, pp.29-31.
221[Go31], p.25 eqn.(13).
222[Go31], p.25(1).
223Since ⊢PA [¬R(n)→ (∃x)¬R(x)]224 , and [(∃x)¬R(x)] is, by definition, [¬(∀x)R(x)].
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sumed simply consistent, i.e.:
⊢PA [(∀x)R(x)] →⊢PA [¬(∀x)R(x)].
By applying the above Deduction Theorem, it follows that:
⊢PA [(∀x)R(x)→ ¬(∀x)R(x)]
⊢PA [¬(∀x)R(x)]
Moreover, we can also prove225 that if PA is assumed simply consistent, then
⊢PA [R(n)] for any given natural number n.
Ergo, PA is ω-inconsistent.
11 Appendix C: Rosser’s proposition
Now, Go¨del226 defines a primitive recursive relation, q(x, y), that holds if, and
only if, x is the Go¨del-number of a well-formed P-formula227, say [H(w)]—which
has a single free variable, [w]—and y is the Go¨del-number of a P-proof of [H(x)].
So, for any natural numbers h, j:
(a) q(h, j) holds if, and only if, j is the Go¨del-number of a P-proof of [H(h)].
Rosser’s argument defines an additional primitive recursive relation, s(x, y),
which holds if, and only if, x is the Go¨del-number of [H(w)], and y is the
Go¨del-number of a P-proof of [¬H(x)]. Hence, for any natural numbers h, j:
(b) s(h, j) holds if, and only if, j is the Go¨del-number of a P-proof of [¬H(h)].
Further, it follows from Go¨del’s Theorems V228 and VII229 that the primitive
recursive relations q(x, y) and s(x, y) are instantiationally equivalent to some
arithmetical relations, Q(x, y) and S(x, y), such that, for any natural numbers
h, j:
(c) If q(h, j) holds, then [Q(h, j)] is P-provable;
(d) If ¬q(h, j) holds, then [¬Q(h, j)] is P-provable;
(e) If s(h, j) holds, then [S(h, j)] is P-provable;
(f) If ¬s(h, j) holds, then [¬S(h, j)] is P-provable;
Now, whilst Go¨del defines [H(w)] as [(∀y)¬Q(w, y)], Rosser’s argument de-
fines [H(w)] as [(∀y)(Q(w, y)→ (∃z)(z ≤ y ∧ S(w, z)))],
Further, whereas Go¨del considers the P-provability of the Go¨delian proposi-
tion, [(∀y)¬Q(h, y)], Rosser’s argument considers the P-provability of the propo-
sition [(∀y)(Q(h, y)→ (∃z)(z ≤ y ∧ S(h, z)))].
We note that, by definition:
(i) q(h, j) holds if, and only if, j is the Go¨del-number of a P-proof of:
[(∀y)(Q(h, y)→ (∃z)(z ≤ y ∧ S(h, z)))];
(ii) s(h, j) holds if, and only if, j is the Go¨del-number of a P-proof of:
[¬((∀y)(Q(h, y)→ (∃z)(z ≤ y ∧ S(h, z))))].
225[Go31], p.26(2).
226[Go31], p.24, 8.1.
227Of his formally defined Peano Arithmetic, P.
228[Go31], p.22.
229[Go31], p.29.
52
11.1 The formal expression of Rosser’s argument
(a) We assume, first, that r is the Go¨del-number of some proof sequence in P
for the proposition [(∀y)(Q(h, y)→ (∃z)(z ≤ y ∧ S(h, z)))].
Hence q(h, r) is true, and [Q(h, r)] is P-provable.
However, we then have that [Q(h, r)→ (∃z)(z ≤ r ∧ S(h, z))] is P-provable.
Further, by Modus Ponens, we have that [(∃z)(z ≤ r ∧ S(h, z)))] is P-provable.
Now, if P is simply consistent, then [¬((∀y)(Q(h, y) → (∃z)(z ≤ y ∧ S(h, z))))]
is not P-provable.
Hence, s(h, n) does not hold for any natural number n, and so ¬s(h, n) holds
for every natural number n.
It follows that [¬S(h, n)] is P-provable for every P-numeral [n].
Hence, [¬((∃z)(z ≤ r ∧ S(h, z)))] is also P-provable - a contradiction.
Hence, [(∀y)(Q(h, y) → (∃z)(z ≤ y ∧ S(h, z)))] is not P-provable if P is simply
consistent.
(b) We assume next that r is the Go¨del-number of some proof-sequence in P for
the proposition [¬((∀y)(Q(h, y)→ (∃z)(z ≤ y ∧ S(h, z))))].
Hence s(h, r) holds, and [S(h, r)] is P-provable.
However, if P is simply consistent, [(∀y)(Q(h, y) → (∃z)(z ≤ y ∧ S(h, z)))] is
not P-provable.
Hence, ¬q(h, n) holds for every natural number n, and [¬Q(h, n)] is P-provable
for all P-numerals [n].
(i) The foregoing implies [y ≤ r → ¬Q(h, y)] is P-provable, and we consider
the following deduction230:
(1) [r ≤ k] . . .Hypothesis
(2) [S(h, r)] . . .By 3(b)
(3) [r ≤ k ∧ S(h, r)] . . .From (1), (2)
(4) [(∃z)(z ≤ k ∧ S(h, z))] . . .From (3)
(ii) From (1)-(4), by the Deduction Theorem, we have that [r ≤ k → (∃z)(z ≤
k ∧ S(h, z))] is provable in P for any P-numeral [k];
(iii) Now, [k ≤ r ∨ r ≤ k] is P-provable for any P-numeral [k];
(iv) Also, [(k ≤ r → ¬Q(h, k)) ∧ (r ≤ k → (∃z)(z ≤ k ∧ S(h, z)))] is P-provable
for any P-numeral [k].
(v) Hence [(¬(k ≤ r) ∨ ¬Q(h, k)) ∧ (¬(r ≤ k) ∨ (∃z)(z ≤ k ∧ S(h, z)))] is
P-provable for any P-numeral [k].
(vi) Hence [¬Q(h, k) ∨ (∃z)(z ≤ k ∧ S(h, z))] is P-provable for any P-numeral
[k].
(vii) Hence [(Q(h, k)→ (∃z)(z ≤ k ∧ S(h, z))] is P-provable for any P-numeral
[k].
(viii) Now, (vii) contradicts our assumption that [¬((∀y)(Q(h, y)→ (∃z)(z ≤
y ∧ S(h, z))))] is P-provable.
230cf. [Me64], p.146.
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(ix) Hence [¬((∀y)(Q(h, y)→ (∃z)(z ≤ y ∧ S(h, z))))] is not P-provable if
P is simply consistent.
However, the claimed contradiction in (viii) only follows if we assume that
P is ω-consistent, and not if we assume that P is simply consistent.
12 Appendix D: A source of true but unprovable
arithmetical propositions
12.1 Go¨del’s Theorem V: The Expressibility Theorem
By Go¨del’s Theorem V231, every recursive relation R(x1, . . . , xn) can be ex-
pressed in PA by a formula [F (x1, . . . , xn)] such that, for any given n-tuple of
natural numbers a1, . . . , an:
If R(a1, . . . , an) is true, then PA-proves [F (a1, . . . , an)]
If ¬R(a1, . . . , an) is true, then PA-proves [¬F (a1, . . . , an)]
Go¨del relies only on the above to conclude—in his Theorem VI232—the ex-
istence of an arithmetical proposition that is formally unprovable in a Peano
Arithmetic, but true under a sound interpretation of the Arithmetic.
12.2 Go¨del’s Theorem VII: Constructing a true but un-
provable arithmetical proposition
However, we show that it is Go¨del’s Theorem VII233 which, for every recursive
relation of the form x0 = φ(x1, . . . , xn), provides an actual blueprint for the
construction of a PA-formula that is PA-unprovable, but true under any sound
interpretation of PA such as B.
12.2.1 Every recursive function is representable in PA
We note that234:
1. Any recursive function f(x1, x2) can be represented by a PA-formula [F (x1, x2,
x3)] such that, for any given natural numbers k,m, n, if f(k,m) = n, then:
(i) PA proves: [F (k,m, n)]
(ii) PA proves: [(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)]
235
2. Go¨del’s β-function is defined as:
β(x1, x2, x3) = rm(1 + (x3 + 1) ⋆ x2, x1)
231[Go31], p.22.
232[Go31], p.24.
233[Go31], p.29.
234cf. [Me64], pp.131-134.
235The symbol ‘[∃1]’ denotes uniqueness, in the sense that the PA-formula
[(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] is a short-hand notation for the PA-formula [¬(∀x3)¬F (x1, x2, x3) ∧
(∀y)(∀z)(F (x1 , x2, y) ∧ F (x1, x2, z)→ y = z)].
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where rm(x1, x2) denotes the remainder obtained on dividing x2 by x1.
3. It follows that, for any sequence of values f(x1, 0), f(x1, 1), . . . , f(x1, n), we
can construct natural numbers b, c, i such that β(b, c, i) = f(x1, i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
where c = j!, and j = max(n, f(x1, 0), f(x1, 1), . . . , f(x1, n).
236
4. Bt(x1, x2, x3, x4) is the following representation in PA of β(x1, x2, x3)
237:
[(∃w)(x1 = ((1+ (x3 +1) ⋆ x2) ⋆ w+ x4)∧ (x4 < 1+ (x3 +1) ⋆ x2))].
5. If f(x1, x2) is defined by:
(i) f(x1, 0) = g(x1)
(ii) f(x1, (x2 + 1)) = h(x1, x2, f(x1, x2))
where g(x1) and h(x1, x2, x3) are recursive functions of lower rank
238 that are
represented in PA by well-formed formulas [G(x1, x2)] and [H(x1, x2, x3, x4)],
then f(x1, x2) is represented in PA by the following well-formed formula, de-
noted by [F (x1, x2, x3)]:
[(∃u)(∃v)(((∃w)(Bt(u, v, 0, w)∧G(x1 , w)))∧Bt(u, v, x2, x3)∧(∀w)(w <
x2 → (∃y)(∃z)(Bt(u, v, w, y)∧Bt(u, v, (w+1), z)∧H(x1 , w, y, z)))].239
12.3 Does the well-formed PA-formula [F (x1, x2, x3)] repre-
sent the recursive function f(x1, x2) strongly in PA?
The question arises: Is [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] PA-provable?
12.3.1 What does “(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)” assert?
Now the arithmetical proposition “(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)” is the assertion that, for
any given natural numbers k,m, we can construct natural numbers t(k,m), u(k,m), v(k,m)
—which are functions of k,m—such that β(u(k,m), v(k,m), 0) = g
′(k) and, for all
i < m, β(u(k,m), v(k,m), i) = h
′(k, i, f ′(k, i)), and β(u(k,m), v(k,m),m) = t(k,m),
where f ′(x1, x2), g
′(x1) and h
′(x1, x2, x3) are any recursive functions that are
formally represented by F (x1, x2, x3), G(x1, x2) and H(x1, x2, x3, x4) respec-
tively such that:
(i) f ′(k, 0) = g′(k)
(ii) f ′(k, (y + 1)) = h′(k, y, f ′(k, y)) for all y < m
(iii) g′(x1) and h
′(x1, x2, x3) are recursive functions that are assumed
to be of lower rank than f ′(x1, x2).
We further note that, for any arbitrarily given sequence of natural numbers
k0, k1, ..., kn, we can clearly determine an infinity of values of up, vp, kp such that
β(up, vp, i) = ki for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, and β(up, vp, (n+ 1)) = kp.
Hence (∃1x3)F (k,m, x3) is also the assertion that, for any given natural
numbers k and m, we can always construct some (non-unique) pair of natural
236cf. [Me64], p.131, Proposition 3.22.
237cf. [Me64], p.131.
238cf. [Me64], p.132; [Go31], p.30(2).
239cf. [Me64], p.132.
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numbers u(k,m), v(k,m) such that β(u(k,m), v(k,m), i) represents the first m terms,
i.e. f ′(k, 0), f ′(k, 1), . . . , f ′(k,m), which are common to every recursive function
such as f ′(x1, x2) that is formally represented by [F (x1, x2, x3].
We can see that this is constructively provable for any given natural numbers
k andm since, if F (x1, x2, x3) is a well-defined arithmetical relation
240, it defines
the Turing-machine TMF that can construct the sequence f
′(k, 0), f ′(k, 1), . . . ,
f ′(k,m) uniquely and verify the assertion.
12.3.2 What does “(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)” assert?
Now, the arithmetical relation “(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)” is the assertion that we
can construct natural numbers t, u, v that are independent of x1 and x2 and
such that, for any given r, s, β(u, v, 0) = g′(r) and, for all i < s, β(u, v, i) =
h′(r, i, f ′(r, i)), and β(u, v, s) = t.
This, however, is false since—using the above argument—we cannot con-
struct natural numbers t, u, v that are independent of x1 and x2
241, and such
that, for any given r, s, β(u, v, 0) = g′(r) and, for all i < s, β(u, v, i) =
h′(r, i, f ′(r, i)), and β(u, v, s) = t.
We conclude that although (∃1x3)F (k,m, x3) is true for any given natural
numbers k,m, the PA-formula [(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)] is not PA-provable.
We thus have:
Theorem 11 Every recursive function is not strongly representable in PA242.
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